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Steadily declining defense budgets and the uncertainty associated with the end 
of the Cold War have stirred a great debate on the proper budgetary mix of men and 
material required to achieve military readiness under conditions of fiscal restraint. 
Many members of Congress and the DoD believe that the structural readiness of the 
today's military has been sacrificed to maintain short term operational readiness. 
The November 1994 election of the first Republican-controlled Congress in 40 
years promised to significantly impact the declining defense budget and address the 
issue of llJ.ilitary readiness. This thesis concludes that while the deficiencies in 
operational readiness of today's armed forces are not a serious problem, the long 
term structural readiness of the armed forces is in jeopardy. While the Republicans 
addressed the long term problem at the margins by increasing the FY96 investment 
accounts, a solution which achieves sustainable military readiness requires a 
reexamination of America's military requirements and the amount of resources it 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The shift in party dominance of the 1 04th Congress has allowed the 
Republicans a unique opportunity to dramatically alter the budget priorities of the 
federal government. The Republican leadership has been unequivocal·in its 
demand for sweeping change in both the size and role of the federal government. 
[Ref. 1, p. 1298] After taking office, the Republican majority quickly advanced an 
aggressive agenda of government reform dubbed the "Contract with America." 
[Ref. 2, p. 3216] The primary objective of the contract is to balance the federal 
budget by the year 2002. 
To achieve this end, the Republicans targeted entitlement spending, 
especially Medicare and Medicaid, as well as domestic discretionary programs for 
reduction.[Ref. 3, p. 1899] In conjunction with these substantial budget cuts, the 
Republicans also called for a reduction in the amount of taxes paid by Americans 
and a "restoration" of military funding.[Ref. 4, p. 167] The so-called Republican 
Budget Revolution of 1995, therefore, could prove to be a pivotal juncture in 
American fiscal policy. The defense budget battle within the context of the larger 
debate on the federal budget is the focus of this thesis. 
Since 1985, almost all congressional attempts to achieve significant 
reductions in the size of the government's annual budget deficit have included 
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defense spending.[Ref. 5, p. 19] A decade of downsizing and budget reductions, 
however, has led to Republican charges that militruy readiness has been neglected 
and the force is in danger of being "hollowed out" as it was during the 
1970's.[Ref. 6] President Clinton has countered that while the militruy forces 
have been reduced during the "right-sizing" following the end of the Cold War, 
"operational readiness" has not been negatively impacted by the downsizing.[Ref. 
7, p.3614] 
Republican critics charge, however, that President Clinton has grossly 
undetfunded the Department of Defense, especially its investment accounts.[Ref. 
8, 2126] With meager funding for both the procurement and research and 
development accounts, the Republicans complain that the money required to 
modernize the militruy' s equipment is insufficient. The lack of funding has 
jeopardized the militruy's long term "structural readiness." To bolster the 
Republican charges, several government and private organizations also identified a 
large shortfall in the amount of defense dollars budgeted for the future years 
defense plan. [Ref. 9] The Republican Congress called for increases in defense 
spending to reverse this trend. 
The intent of this thesis is twofold. First, it provides a detailed record of 
the evolution of the defense bills in FY96. Beginning with the President's defense 
budget proposal, this thesis follows the congressional action on the FY96 defense 
2 
budget. It tracks the development of the defense budget, examining the budget 
resolution, authorization and appropriations bills, and the defense supplemental 
and recissions bills enacted in 1995. It closely examines the major political issues 
which dominated the defense debate in 1995. Secondly, this thesis focuses on the 
readiness debate which underscored the FY96 defense budget battles. It analyzes 
the role budgeting for readiness played in shaping the FY96 defense budget. 
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1 frames the defense budget 
debate in two ways. First, it provides the reader an historical overview of United 
State's defense spending . It shows how defense has fared over the last two 
decades in both a relative sense and compared to the other federal budget 
categories. The defense budget is broken down into its different spending 
categories in order to provide insight into how the government is spending its 
defense dollars. It also examines how defense spending fared in the context of the 
Budget Revolution of 1995. Additionally, part one of the thesis frames the current 
debate on military readiness. The thesis defmes and discusses the components of 
military readiness. It also examines the extent to which different defense 
spending categories impact the different readiness components of the military. 
Part two of this thesis tracks the evolution of the defense portion of the 
FY96 budget resolution, the FY96 defense bills, and the defense supplemental and 
recissions bills enacted in 1995. It documents the path of each bill from creation 
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to eventual passage. It discusses the differences between President Clinton's 
budget proposal and the House, Senate, and conference defense bills. The 
political issues which focused the debate in the defense committees, House and 
Senate conference committees, and the White House are explored. The eventual 
compromises required to pass each of the bills are examined in detail. 
The fmal part of this thesis examines the larger issue of the extent to which 
defense spending in FY96 addressed the readiness problem. It analyzes what the 
defense budget spending priorities were for FY96 and how the fmal defense bills 
addressed the readiness issue. The thesis also comments on how the FY96 defense 
bills impact the defense "shortfall" identified earlier in the year. The thesis 
concludes with an analysis of future defense requirements and avenues for further 
research. 
This thesis is primarily based on data and information from the respective 
defense committees and subcommittees in the House of Representatives and 
Senate, together with the budget resolution, defense supplemental and recissions 
bills, fmal defense authorization and appropriations bills, conference agreements, 
and continuing resolutions. Additional information was obtained through a 
comprehensive review of current professional periodicals, journals, news briefs, 
and congressional research issue briefs. This materia~ provided the bulk of 
information for documenting the evolution of the defense bills. Several books 
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contained in the bibliography provided additional material on the defense 
readiness issue. 
This thesis narrows the scope of its analysis of the FY96 defense budget 
battle to the time period between the end of 1994 and fmal passage, if appropriate, 
of each defense bill. However, material outside this time frame is provided for an 
historical perspective on the defense spending. While the FY96 debate on defense 
occurs as a portion of the larger debate on the federal budget, this thesis focuses 
primarily on the readiness aspect of the debate. In its analysis, the thesis also 
largely ignores the separate defense military construction bill, although its budget 
is often included in defense spending totals. 
This study serves as a comprehensive record of the defense budget debate 
in 1995. It also provides significant insight into the readiness issues that drove a 
large portion of that debate. Lastly, this thesis identifies how the larger 
congressional battle on the federal budget impacted defense spending for FY96. 
This work should be of particular significance and benefit to all faculty and 
students interested in public policy and budgeting, and to any Department of 
Defense personnel involved in the DoD budgeting process. 
5 
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II. READINESS AND DEFENSE SPENDING 
A. RECENT TRENDS IN DEFENSE SPENDING 
Before undertaking the larger debate on defense spending, it is useful to 
examine the historical trends in defense spending. An evaluation of this data lends 
perspective to the current debate on defense spending. This section of the thesis provides 
historical defense spending data in several forms. First, it examines defense spending at 
the macro-economic level, comparing the amount of money spent by the government on 
defense versus the American economy as whole. Next, it explores how the Department of 
Defense budget fared against other segments of the federal budget, examining the defense 
budget as a percentage oftotal federal outlays. This section concludes with an analysis of 
the size of the defense budget itself, comparing recent defense spending against past, 
inflation adjusted, defense outlays. 
1. Defense as Percentage of GDP/GNP 
Analysis of America's defense spending since World War II shows the United 
States is currently devoting a much smaller percentage of its economic resources to fund 
defense. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the relationship of defense outlays to the GDP of 


















Figure 1. NationalDefense Outlays as a Percentage ofGDP, 1947-2000. From 
Ref 5. 
Compared to its Korean War high of 14.5 percent, FY95 defense outlays 
amounted to a modem historical low of3.9 percent ofGDP. Current predictions offuture 
defense outlays foresee defense outlays falling below 3.0 percent ofGDP by the year 
2000. [Ref 5, p. 21] Even during the "soft" defense spending years following World War 
II and the war in Vietnam, the United States devoted a larger percentage of its economy 
to defense. These figures seem to refute the common perception that defense currently 
consumes an historically disproportionate large share ofthe nation's resources. The 
incredible sustained growth ofthe American economy, however, tends to distort the 
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defense spending percentages illustrated in Figure 1. Because a shrinking slice of a 
growing pie may continue to provide increasing resources for defense, an examination of 
the how defense outlays fared relative to other government spending categories provides 
better insight into the recent trends in defense spending. 
2. Defense as a Percentage of Total Government Outlays 
While spending on defense fell as a percentage of the nation's GDP, it also suffered 
from increased competition from other federal spending programs. Figure 2 shows how 
defense fared as a percentage of total federal outlays. 
120 
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Figure 2. Allocation of Federal Outlays as a % of Total Federal Outlays 1947-
2000. From Ref. 5. 
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Mandatory spending categories comprise those federal programs which are 
automatically funded each year and do not need to be appropriated annually by Congress. 
Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and interest on the national debt currently comprise 
over 75 percent of mandatory spending and represent approximately 60 percent of all 
federal outlays. [Ref 5, p. 27] It is easy to see how the dramatic rise in mandatory 
spending has squeezed discretionary spending. In fact, Congress currently only 
appropriates approximately one-third of the annual federal outlays during its yearly 
budgeting process. Current Congressional Budget Office projections predict the sustained 
growth in mandatory spending will consume a continually greater portion of the federal 
budget. Projections show discretionary spending declining from its current 34 percent to 
26 percent of federal outlays by the year 2005. [Ref 10, p. 22] Thus, the growth of 
mandatory spending bodes ill for defense as it must compete against these programs for 
scarce government funding. While it is apparent that defense spending declined both as a 
percentage of the nation's GDP and federal outlays, an examination of the defense budgets 
themselves should provide additional insight into the defense debate. 
3. Recent Defense Budget Trends 
Real defense outlays are approaching their lowest levels since the drawdown 
following World War II. Only those defense budgets enacted during the "hollow force" 
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Figure 3. Real Growth/Decline in National Defense Funding 1955-1995 (FY96 
Dollars). From RefS. 
Table 1. Real Budget Growth in National Defense Funding Outlays, 1986-1995, 
FY96 Dollars). From Ref 5. 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Outlays 374.1 375.2 374.2 375.6 357 337.1 318.1 306 293.5 278.2 
%Chan2e 5.6% 0.3% -0.3% 0.4% -4.9% -5.6% -5.6% -3.8% -4.1% -5.2% 
Defense budget outlays, appropriated earlier during the Reagan defense build-up in the 
early and mid 1980's, reached their peak in 1989. By FY95, however, defense outlays 
comprised only 74 percent ofthat amount. [Ref 5, p. 19] 
Nevertheless, it is the defense future years spending program which has critics of 
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the defense drawdown most concerned. At the beginning of the FY96 congressional 
budgeting process, the administration planned to continue its defense cutbacks. These 
reductions would slash defense in real terms to an unprecedented low, both as a 
percentage of GDP and total federal outlays. The administration1s Future Years Defense 
Plan (FYDP) would reduce defense spending to levels not seen since the 11hollow years11 of 
the 19701S. The anticipated effect these further budget reductions would have on our 
nation1s defense readiness contributed to the sharp backlash in Congress. Before 
discussing the defense budget battle in FY96, an examination of the readiness debate 
which drove a major portion of the budget debate is required. 
B. FRAMING THE READINESS DEBATE 
The primary mission of the armed forces ofthe United States is to win the nations1 
wars. On the battlefield, the effectiveness and efficiency of the armed forces is relatively 
simple to ascertain. In peacetime, however, without any actual combat to gauge the 
armed forces1 performance, it is much more difficult to judge their preparedness for war. 
Therefore, the nation uses broad indicators, collectively lumped together under the term 
readiness, to appraise the military. This section explores the theory behind readiness, 
what components make up readiness and where they can be found in the military. It then 
translates these readiness terms into defense budget accounts which impact these readiness 
indicators. Finally, it looks at current trends in the defense readiness accounts. 
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1. Readiness Theory 
The focal point in the current defense debate is readiness. The United States' 
National Military Strategy answers the question 'ready for what?'. [Ref 11] Taking its cue 
from the President's National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy identifies 
several threats to the nation's security and tasks the military to prepare itself to combat 
them. [Ref 12] Primary among these missions is the need for the armed forces to 
successfully prosecute two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). Most 
defense planners envision a conflict in the Middle East, (e.g., a "Desert Storm"), occurring 
in conjunction with a war against North Korea as a likely two MRC scenario. Additional 
taskings in the National Military Strategy such as drug interdiction and counter-terrorism 
operations compound the military's resource requirements. The crux of the readiness 
debate, however, is what constitutes one's definition of readiness. 
According to Richard Betts, a Columbia University professor, the "popular notion 
of readiness refers to winning a war; narrow, professional notions focus on efficient 
performance." [Ref 13, p.27] A useful definition of readiness must "incorporate both size 
and efficiency." [Ref 13, p. 27] In his three part definition of readiness, Betts draws on 
the relationship of "available time and needed capability." Simply, a nation that can 
convert potential combat capability into actual combat capability before the onset of war is 
ready. One that cannot, is not ready. [Ref 13, p. 28] Betts also argues that "a 
meaningful concept of readiness must not only cover the immediate situation , but the 
prospective situation some weeks, months, or years down the road." .[Ref 13, p. 30] 
Betts goes on to distinguish between different types of readiness. 
13 
a. Operational Readiness 
Operational readiness, according to Betts, " is about efficiency and is 
measured in how soon an existing unit can reach peak capability for combat." [Ref 13, p. 
40] Indicators of operational readiness include training tempo, usually measured in terms 
such as flying hours or tanks miles, and maintenance efficiency reports, which note the 
percentage of a unit's equipment that is operationally ready. Lacking the funding to 
support both training exercises and equipment maintenance, the "hollow force" of the 
1970's suffered from reduced operational readiness. 
b. Structural Readiness 
Structural readiness comprises the other half of the readiness equation. 
Structural readiness "concerns mass" and the "size of the forces necessary to deal with the 
enemy." [Ref 13, p. 41] In simple terms, structural readiness is about size. It is about 
having a sufficient number of personnel and equipment to defeat the enemy. During the 
Cold War, the Soviets arguably enjoyed an advantage in structural readiness over their 
NATO counterparts. 
Operational and structural readiness must compete for scarce defense 
dollars. If funding emphasizes "keeping existing units fully up to snuff, there is less 
available to buy additional units to keep on a threadbare operational status." [Ref 13, p. 
43] From a budgetary perspective, operational and structural readiness comprise the 
intellectual basis for what this thesis terms the Readiness Triad. The Readiness Triad is 
comprised of three segments, or legs, each of which must be properly addressed in the 
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defense budget to ensure operational and structural readiness. 
2. The Readiness Triad 
The first leg of the Readiness Triad is force structure. Force structure refers to the 
basic size ofthe military in terms of personnel and equipment. It is measured in terms of 
Army divisions, Air Force wings, Navy ships, and other similarly quantifiable 
measurements. Force structure primarily addresses structural readiness. The military 
must possess the requisite number of men and machines to be able to deal with multiple 
regional adversaries. 
Weapons modernizatipn comprises the second leg ofthe Readiness Triad. The 
military's equipment modernization program and its funding address this leg of the triad. 
Readiness indicators in this leg include the age of current weapons and the number of new 
weapons under development. Given the rapid technological advance in military weapons 
systems, it is crucial that the military possess modern weapons systems in combat. 
Weapons modernization provides primarily for structural readiness. Investment in new, 
advanced weapons, supports the long term readiness of American forces by ensuring they 
are properly equipped to combat an increasingly sophisticated foe. 
The last leg of the Readiness Triad is operational ability. This somewhat nebulous 
term encompasses the degree to which existing personnel and equipment have achieved 
their potential combat capability. Defense funds spent on training ammunition, aircraft 
fuel, repairing damaged equipment, and other similar expenses hone the expertise of 
existing military forces. This leg of the Triad is the most difficult to measure and analysts 
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must rely on artificial indicators such as •tank miles• or •training days• to judge the 
proficiency of a unit. Operational ability addresses the short term needs of Betts• 
operational readiness. 
This thesis argues that long term success in maintaining the militaris readiness lies 
in achieving a balance among all three legs. Serious decay of any one of the three legs 
could jeopardize American readiness and success on the battlefield. For example, Iraq 
demonstrated during Desert Storm that a military, hobbled by a weak leg in its Readiness 
Triad, could not hope to compete against a well rounded adversary. Although large and 
equipped with modem weapon systems, the comparatively miserable operational ability of 
the Iraqi military doomed it to failure. In a similar fashion, although Great Britain 
possesses a modem, well trained military, it simply does not have the force structure to 
allow it to handle the demands of a 2 MRC scenario. In the United States, a considerable 
portion of the current defense readiness debate concerns the weapons modernization leg 
of the Triad. [Ref 14, p. 34] To see the trends in defense readiness, it is first useful to 
identify the segments of defense budget which address each leg of the Triad. 
3. Budgetary Components of Readiness 
Although evaluating readiness in monetary terms is somewhat crude and simplistic, 
it does provide quantifiable insight into the readiness debate. Military Personnel 
(MilPers), Operations and Maintenance (O&M), Research, Development, Testing, and 
Evaluation (RDT &E), and Procurement are the four largest defense budget functions and 
comprise over 90 percent of the current DoD budget. [Ref 5, p. 6] An examination of 
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each defense spending function and the components of the Readiness Triad which it 
addresses provides additional insight into readiness debate. 
a. Military Personal 
The MilPers account pays for the salaries and benefits of the men and 
women in the armed forces. The MilPers account addresses two legs of the Readiness 
triad. First, MilPers supports the basic force structure of the 1.5 million man military. 
Secondly, the MilPers account bolsters operational ability. By providing salaries relatively 
competitive with the civilian community, the MilPers budget helps to attract and maintain 
high quality personnel in the military. Although the MilPers account funds two legs of the 
Readiness Triad, it is difficult to assign a set percentage of the account's dollars to either 
leg. 
b. Operations and Maintenance 
The O&M accounts funds a litany of military programs. Like MilPers, this 
'fast spending' account outlays most of its budgetary authority each fiscal yea~. [Ref 15, 
p. A21] Most of the money in this account pays for yearly training expenses, defense 
infrastructure support, and equipment maintenance. Although small portions ofthis 
diverse budget function do support programs within the other two readiness legs, the 
O&M accounts primarily address the operational ability leg of the Readiness Triad. 
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c. Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation 
The RDT &E accounts indirectly fund the modernization leg of the 
Readiness Triad. Both generic and weapon specific military research programs receive 
funding from this account. RDT &E funds produce technological advancements which are 
then incorporated in new weapon designs. The RDT &E accounts thus fuel the long term 
advancement in weapon modernization. 
d Procurement 
After developing a weapon system with RDT &E funds, the military 
purchases the new equipment with money from its procurement accounts. The 
procurement defense budget funds the purchase of new tanks, aircraft, ships, and similar 
items. The procurement accounts support the weapons modernization leg of the triad. 
Although the procurement funds replace old and worn out weapons in the existing force 
structure, the majority of the equipment costs are in the technical advances incorporated 
into increasingly sophisticated designs. In his book, Affording Defense, Jacques Gansler 
estimates that the costs of new weapons systems are growing at a rate of 5 to 7 percent a 
year above inflation. [Ref 16, p. 61] Therefore, the replacement of a 15 year old weapon 
with a new one requires over double the defense funds of the original (excluding inflation.) 
4. Recent Trends in the Readiness Accounts 
The end of the Cold War and the "right sizing" of the American military which 
followed left the United States with 29 percent fewer military members than a decade 
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earlier. Within this force structure reduction, the MilPers and O&M budgets also 
declined, but at rates significantly smaller than the force structure as a whole (25 percent 
and 18 percent respectively). Thus, the operational ability leg ofthe Readiness Triad fared 
comparatively well during the last ten years. 
The accounts supporting the weapons modernization legs of the Readiness Triad, 
however, did not fare so well. Although RDT &E declined only 21 percent, the much 
larger procurement accounts fell by 61 percent. Figure 4 graphically illustrates the trends 
in these four defense budget functions during the last decade. These figures lend 
credibility to the defense critics demand for changes in the FY96 defense budget to 
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ill. THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET PROPOSAL AND THE CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET RESOLUTION 
The startling Republican victories in the November 1994 congressional elections 
resulted in a GOP majority in both the House and Senate, an event which had not 
occurred in 40 years. [Ref 1] The Republicans of the 1 04th Congress held a 230 to 204 
majority in the House (plus 1 independent) and a slimmer 53 to 47 seat plurality in the 
Senate. [Ref 17] The Republican leadership quickly advanced an aggressive agenda of 
government restructure and fiscal reform. The GOP agenda, dubbed the Contract with 
America, called for massive reduction in federal entitlements and non-defense 
discretionary spending, a tax cut, and a restoration of defense funding. 
These competing Republican objectives made any changes to the current defense 
drawdown much more contentious. This chapter discusses several issues which 
dominated the early defense budget debate. It presents the President's two defense budget 
proposals and competing defense budget proposals within Congress. It then follows the 
defense debate through the congressional budget committees, on the House and Senate 
floor, and in the conference committee. The chapter concludes with a summary of how 
the final congressional budget resolution compared to the White House, House, and 
Senate recommendations for defense. 
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A. EARLY DEFENSE ISSUES 
1. Deficit Hawks Versus Defense Hawks 
The overaching goal of the 1 04th Republican Congress was to balance the federal 
budget by the year 2002. [Ref 3, p. 3218] The chronic imbalance between yearly 
government revenues and expenditures produced a federal budget which had not balanced 
in 25 years and a debt of almost 5 trillion dollars. [Ref 18, p. 33] Obviously, an increase, 
or at least a freeze in the planned defense drawdown, would retard the general Republican 
effort to reduce expenditures. Disagreement over defense spending threatened to divide 
the Republican majority. Those who favored an increase in defense spending, the "defense 
hawks," found themselves opposed by those Republicans wanting to constrain defense 
spending in hopes of trimming the federal deficit, the "deficit hawks." 
The defense hawks were led by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman 
Strom Thurmond, R-SC, and House National Security Committee Chairman Floyd 
Spence, R-SC, both of whom argued for freezing defense spending at its FY95 level and 
adjusting it for inflation thereafter. [Ref 19, p.10] This proposed freeze would add $140 
billion to the planned defense budget authority through FY200 1. Similarly, Senators John 
McCain, R-AZ, and John Warner, R-V A, in an open letter to their fellow congressional 
colleagues, called on Congress to fulfill its mandate "by halting the Clinton 
Administration's defense budget reduction and freezing defense for at least one year." 
[Ref 6] 
The deficit hawks, on the other hand, believed their balanced budget "mandate" 
outweighed any other budget initiative. They resisted efforts to add money to the defense 
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budget and preferred that any new money for defense come from restructuring defense 
programs which Congress had already authorized. [Ref 4, p. 167] Deficit hawks hoped 
to avoid adding to the tab which they would have to cut out of other programs. 
A CNN/USA Today poll conducted in late November 1994 found increased 
defense spending was the least popular item in the Republican Contract with America, 
with 55 percent of poll respondents opposed to the defense increase. [Ref 4, p. 169] 
Acutely aware ofthese numbers, several senior GOP leaders took a cautious middle 
position. Congressman John Kasich, R-OH, Chairman of the House Budget Committee, 
while not flatly opposed to the defense increase, responded "we'd better do it under the 
microscope." [Ref 4, p. 166] Similarly, Speaker ofthe House, Newt Gingrich, R-GA, 
straddled the issue, commenting that "I'm a hawk, but a cheap hawk." [Ref 20, p. 1 0] 
2. Non-Defense Programs 
Both defense and deficit hawks focused their energies on the so called "non-
defense" programs in the defense budget. Non-defense items comprise a litany of non-
traditional programs "that some may consider not to contribute wholly and directly to 
military readiness." [Ref 19, p. 7] Non-defense programs had grown rapidly during the 
previous five years and comprised more than $11 billion dollars in FY95. Table 2 contains 
a list of non-defense items contained in the President's FY96 defense budget proposal. 
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T bl 2 'N D fi a e . on- e ense 'I h FY96B d P terns m t e u 1get I F roposa. rom R f 19 e . 
Environmental Cleanup and Compliance $4,987 million 
Environmental Restoration 1,622 million 
Environmental Compliance 2,209 million 
Base Realignment and Closure Restoration 457 million 
Conservation/Pollution Prevention/Environmental Technology 699 million 
Defense Conversion Programs $1,831 million 
Personnel Transition Assistance 1, 146 million 
Office ofEconomic Adjustment/Community Assistance 168 million 
Technology Reinvestment Project and Related R&D 516 million 
Other R&D Programs $2,245 million 
Dual Use R&D 2,226 million 
Medical Earmarks/Programs 19 million 
O&M Activities $1,211 million 
Drug Interdiction 680 million 
Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction ("Nunn-Lugar") 371 million 
Humanitarian Assistance 80 million 
International Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement 65 million 
Sporting Events & Holiday Support 15 million 
Grand Total $10,274 million 
Early in the defense debate, many Republicans viewed the elimination of these programs 
as a multi-billion dollar defense windfall. Clearly, programs such as the $210 million 
earmarked for breast cancer research or the $14.4 million to support the Olympic games in 
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Atlanta seemed out of place in the defense budget. [Ref 21, p. 1] Pentagon comptroller 
John Hamre commented "These are all good programs, they just aren't our job." [Ref 21, 
p. 1] However, the wholesale elimination of the so-called "non-defense" programs, and 
the five year, $60 billion savings to follow, would not materialize. 
Supporters of the non-defense programs focused on two themes in their defense of 
these programs. First, many of the non-defense projects could prove legally difficult to 
eliminate. For example, failure to properly fund many of the environmental programs 
could result in violations of federal, state, or local regulations, laws the military must also 
obey. [Ref 19, p. 7] Second, several senior administration defense officials, including 
Secretary ofDefense William Perry, contended that many of these non-defense programs, 
while possibly falling outside the narrow scope of traditional military thinking, contributed 
to a broader notion of national security. Secretary Perry cited both the Nunn-Lugar 
project to dismantle nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and the dual use 
technologies developed with funding from the Technology Reinvestment Plan as 
examples. [Ref 4, p. 169] Congress attempted to reduce or eliminate several of these 
programs in its FY95 defense supplemental appropriations and recissions bill as well as 
the FY96 defense authorization and appropriations bills. 
3. Defense Budget Shortfalls 
In July of 1994 the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report concluding 
that due to overprograrnrning, the current future years defense plan (FYDP) budget fell 
short of defense requirements by $150 billion. [Ref 19, p. 5] This report fueled the 
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defense hawk furor for increased defense spending. Defense hawk Congressman Duncan 
Hunter, R-CA, responded "GAO is not a pro-defense organization, when they see a $150 
billion shortfall that is cause for alarm." [Ref 4, p. 168] The GAO report focused on the 
Pentagon's chronic mismanagement of major weapons programs and accused the DoD of 
consistently underfunding major defense programs. 
A December 1994 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report supported most of 
the GAO study's findings. It identified a potential mismatch in defense funding ofbetween 
$65 and $109 billion. [Ref 9] The CBO report, summarized in Table 3, outlined a 
number of factors which could contribute to the shortfall. 
T bl 3 CBO P t t. I Sh rt a e : o en aa 0 ages m e . th FYDP F rom R f 19 e. 
1995 Pay Raise $6 billion 
1996-99 Full Pay Raises $17 billion 
DoD Future Adjustments $20 billion 
Weapons Cost Growth $8 billion 
Larger 1995 Base Closure Round Costs $7 billion 
DoD Quality of Life Adjustments $2 billion 
Contingency Operations $6 billion 
TOTAL, Definite and Likely Areas of Cost Growth $65 billion 
Pessimistic Estimate ofWeapons Cost Growth $24 billion 
Environmental Programs Cost Growth $20 billion 
TOTAL, Less Certain Areas of Cost Growth $44 billion 
Although budget shortfalls are not new (CBO projected a $325 billion shortfall 
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during the Reagan years), defense hawks worried that the administration's FYDP may 
negatively impact defense. Especially worrisome to the defense hawks were the out years 
of the FYDP. Defense hawks feared the aging of the current generation ofweapons and 
the need for their eventual replacement, in combination with the limited defense funds 
projected for the future, may create a 11bow wave of acquisition programs. 11 [Ref. 19, p. 7] 
By continually postponing the planned purchase of new equipment, defense hawks 
believed the White House was creating a huge deficit in weapons procurement funding. 
4. Readiness 
Budgeting for military readiness accounted for a large portion of the early debate 
on defense in 1995. Critics of the administration's defense program pointed to the real and 
potential readiness problems for the military in their focus on deficiencies in both short 
term operational readiness and long term weapons modernization. Again, the debate over 
what constitutes a proper definition of military readiness complicated the defense debate. 
a. Short Term Readiness 
In his 1994 report, How Serious is the Clinton Deficit?, Senator McCain 
outlined a series of short term readiness failures in the Clinton defense budget. Citing 
excerpts from reports generated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Senator McCain described 
the lack of training funds, backlog of repair orders, and the decline in several combat 
units' readiness ratings as evidence of decaying short term readiness. [Ref. 22] Other 
defense critics pointed to the drain on operational funds created by the administration's 
27 
-----------------------------------------------------
supposed eagerness to commit troops overseas. Several unbudgeted contingency 
operations in places such as Haiti and Somalia fueled the defense critics' charges that the 
White House had both sacrificed critical O&M funds and created an untenably high 
operational tempo for military personnel. According to some, these forces combined to 
create "pockets ofunreadiness in the force." [Ref 8, p. 2129] 
The administration countered that while anecdotal evidence suggested 
otherwise, short term readiness rates were at an all time high. [Ref 7, p. 3615] The 
reduced readiness rating of three Army divisions and several Navy fighter squadrons were 
not symptomatic of an overall decline in readiness, but rather, "reflect deliberate 
tradeoffs ..... to accommodate temporary shortages." [Ref 7, p. 3615] Defense 
administration officials asserted that these types of shortages reflect a timing problem 
inherent in funding contingency operations. Chapter IV ofthe thesis will provide a more 
detailed analysis of this subject. 
b. Long Term Readiness 
Defense critics also charged that long term military readiness, provided for 
by an adequate weapons modernization program, was in jeopardy. Early in the FY96 
defense budget debate, the House National Security Committee argued that 
"modernization .... has been mortgaged in a desperate attempt to bolster near term 
readiness." [Ref 23, p. 1659] Given the drastic reduction in the size of the procurement 
budget within the last decade, defense critics believed the current defense budget 
inadequate for weapons modernization. They pointed to items such as the Air Force's 
28 
strategic airlift and the Army's truck fleet as systems requiring immediate attention. [Ref 
19, p. 1 0] "Our legacy to the next generation is likely to be 45 year old training aircraft, 
35 year old bombers, 25 year old fighters, 35 year old trucks, and 40 year old helicopters," 
reported a defense panel made up of former JCS members. [Ref 24, p. 20] The Clinton 
administration responded to this criticism with a new defense proposal prior to the 
President's budget proposal. 
B. THE CLINTON PLUS-UP 
In September 1994, Deputy Secretary ofDefense John Deutch acknowledged the 
possibility of defense budget shortfalls identified by GAO and CBO and called for $40 
billion in additional defense cuts from the services. [Ref 25, p. 6] The delay or 
cancellation of nine major weapons systems identified in Deutch's memorandum to cover 
the funding gap produced a strong outcry from the administration's defense critics. [Ref 
26, p. 1] In response to these complaints, Deutch announced that the White House was 
considering an increase in the defense budget to cover at least half of the shortfall. [Ref 
27, p. 81] 
During December, in his first major policy decision after the Republicans had 
gained control of Congress, President Clinton announced a $25 billion increase to the six 
year FYDP to address the defense budget funding shortfall. [Ref 26, p. 1] Although the 
services would still have to cut or postpone funding for $12 billion in weapons programs, 
the additional dollars proposed by Clinton alleviated most of the previously proposed cuts. 
Clinton's defense plus-up provided an additional $2 billion to his FY96 defense budget 
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proposal. Critics were quick to note, however, that most of the President's funding 
increases took place in the last two years of the FYDP. Table 4 details the President's 
defense spending augmentation. 
Table 4. President Clinton's Defense Proposal, (Current Year Dollars). From 
Ref 28 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Previous Clinton Plan $244 $241 $248 $254 $261 $268 
Proposed Increase $2 $2 $3 $3 $6 $9 
New Budget Request $246 $243 $251 $257 $267 $277 
Revised estimates of weapons programs costs by the DoD increased the defense 
budget shortfall to $49 billion by late November. The Clinton plus-up addressed the 
funding dilemma with a combination of program cuts, spending increases, and new 
economic assumptions. [Ref 26, p. 1] Defense analysts regarded the Clinton defense 
plus-up as an effort to blunt the· intense criticism of his defense plan by the new Republican 
Congress. [Ref 26, p. 1] Still, defense hawks charged that the plus-up was merely "a 
Band-Aid, where you need a tourniquet." [Ref 26, p. 1] Table 5 illustrates the 
breakdown of the $49 Billion plus-up. 
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Table 5. Breakdown of the $49 Billion Clinton Plus-U . From Ref 26. 
Increased Defense Spending FY96-FY01 $25 Billion 
Program/Budget Cuts $12 Billion 
----------------------~----------------~1 
Lower Inflation Estimate $12 Billion 
----------------------~----------------~1. 
Total $49 Billion 
C. THE CLINTON BUDGET PROPOSAL 
During the first week in February, President Clinton unveiled his FY96 budget 
proposal to Congress. Highlights ofhis proposal included cuts to non-defense 
discretionary spending, a small middle class tax cut, and a $196.7 billion deficit. [Ref 29, 
p. 1] Always a politi.cal document, the President's budget proposal was both applauded 
for its effort to reduce the size of government and derided for its defeatist approach to 
balancing the budget. [Ref 29, p. 1] For defense, President Clinton's proposal continued 
the drawdown in effect over the past decade. In real terms, the proposed six year FYDP 
would see a decline in defense budget authority in FY96 and FY97, a leveling off period 
during FY98 and FY99, and a slight increase in FYOO and FYOl. [Ref 19, p. 13] Table 5 
documents President Clinton's proposed defense spending for FY96-FY01. 
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Table 6. FY96 Presidential Budget Proposal, (Current Year and Constant FY96 
Dollars), and Percent of Growth or Decline From Previous Year. From Ref 5 and 19. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
Budget Authority-Cur. 257.6 253.4 259.6 266.3 276.0 286.5 1599.4 
Budget Authority-Con. 257.6 246.2 245.0 244.3 246.6 249.3 1489.0 
Real Growth/Decline 
-4.8% -4.5% -0.5% -0.3% 0.9% 1.1% NA 
Outlays-Current 260.9 256.9 254.5 259.7 267.8 271.5 1571.3 
Outlays-Constant 260.9 249.6 240.5 238.2 239.3 236.4 1474.9 
Real Growth/Decline 
-6.2% -4.4% -3.6% -0.9% 0.4% -1.2% NA 
D. THE NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT 
As part of the Contract with America, House Republicans introduced the National 
Security Revitalization Act (H. Con. 7) to uphold their campaign promise of military 
restoration. The legislation provided the Republicans an opportunity to advance a non-
binding declaration for increased defense spending. Other provisions within the bill 
included a major reduction in funding for U. N. peacekeeping operations and the 
formation of a blue ribbon commission to study military readiness. The bill passed the 
House on February 16th on a vote of 241-181. However, a controversial amendment to 
eliminate language in the bill which called for the establishment of an anti-missile defense 
system for the United States passed the House by a narrow margin of 218-212. [Ref 30, 
p. 998] 
Although there was interest in some of the provisions qf ~he National Security 
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Revitalization Act in the Senate, that body took a much more conservative approach to 
defense in FY96. The Senate largely ignored the House bill's call for increased defense 
spending and instead concentrated on the military's role in foreign policy issues. The 
proposed Senate measure (S 5) would have reduced funding for the United Nations 
peacekeeping operations and imposed additional restrictions on placing U. S. troops under 
foreign command. [Ref 31 p. 878] However, although some portions ofthe House bill 
found their way into other Senate bills, notably the defense authorization bill, the Senate 
left most of the House bill on the committee floor. Without the requisite support in the 
Senate, interest in the House's now symbolic National Security Revitalization Act faded 
from congressional attention. 
E. HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE AND FLOOR DEBATE 
On 10 May, 1995, the House Budget Committee passed its version of the FY96 
budget resolution on a 24-17 vote. [Ref 32, p. 182] The Budget Committee added $9.5 
billion to the President's request for defense. The Committee's $267.3 billion defense 
budget sought to reflect a defense strategy which was "responsible, sustainable, and 
matched by the requisite number of dollars - in contrast to the mismatch between spending 
and strategy in the Clinton budget." [Ref 32, p. 15] The Committee believed its budget 
supported both "near term readiness and balanced modernization." [Ref 32, p. 15] 
Overall, the Committee's plan would add $70 billion in budget authority to the defense 
budget over FY96-FY02. [Ref 33, p. 1342] However, measured in constant dollars, the 
proposed FY96 budget resolution cut both BA and outlays from the FY95 level and 
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required further cuts every year through FY02. In other words, real spending for defense 
was lower than the FY95 levels every year in the budget resolution. 
On 18 May, 1995, in a 238-193 vote along party lines, the House passed its 
version of the FY96 budget resolution (H. Con Res. 67). Despite several attempts to 
amend the House Budget Committee's recommendation for defense, the Committee's 
proposal was not changed. The House-passed version of the budget resolution sought to 
provide additional funds for weapons modernization ($6 billion) and quality of life 
programs ($3 billion). [Ref 34, p. 4] The fate of the theater missile defense program, F-
22 fighter, B-2 bomber, Commanche helicopter and several other major weapons systems 
received a considerable boost from the vote. [Ref 31, p. 3] 
The House debate over increased defense spending witnessed the formation of 
unusual alliances between Republican deficit hawks and Democrats opposed to increased 
defense spending. For example, Congressman Ronald Dellums, R-CA, ranking House 
member of the House National Security Committee, and House Budget Committee 
Chairman, John Kasich, both vowed to fight the use of the added defense funds for 
additional B-2 bomber production. This ideological split foreshadowed a major showdown 
on FY96 defense spending in Congress. [Ref 35, p. 37] Table 7 at the end of this chapter 
provides a summary of the House passed, Senate passed, and conference agreement 
budget resolutions for FY96. 
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F. SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE AND FLOOR DEBATE 
A day after the House Budget Committee, the Senate Budget Committee passed 
its version of the budget resolution 12-10. [Ref 36, p. 299] Led by deficit hawk and 
Budget Chairman Senator Pete Domenici, the Senate Budget Committee rejected efforts 
to increase the defense budget. Instead, the Senate Budget Committee simply 
incorporated the President's defense budget proposal into its own budget resolution. 
The Senate Budget Committee's resolution focused on "DoD's two most important 
initiatives: readiness and quality oflife." [Ref 36, p. 28] However, the Committee 
considered only the short term, operational portion of strategic readiness. The Committee 
went as far as to include DoD language on the number of ship steaming days and Navy 
flying hours their budget would support in their report. [Ref 36, p. 28] On the subject of 
weapons modernization, the report merely substituted the Administration's plans as its 
own. The report concluded with the assertion that by streamlining and restructuring the 
DoD acquisition process, billions of additional dollars could be made available for defense. 
[Ref 36, p. 36] 
On a 55-42 vote along party lines, the Senate passed its version of the FY96 
budget resolution (S. Con. Res. 13) on May 25th. The defense portion of the Senate 
passed version of the budget resolution remained essentially unchanged compared to the 
Senate Budget Committee's recommendations. For defense, the final Senate budget 
resolution differed only slightly from the Clinton defense budget proposal during FY96-
FYOO. Surprisingly, however, the Senate bill provided $10.6 billion less in budget 
authority in FYOl. [Ref 19, p. 13] An amendment to the Senate budget resolution 
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offered by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond, R-SC, and 
ranking minority member Senator Sam Nunn, D-GA, to increase defense spending to the 
House-passed levels failed on a vote of 40-60. [Ref 19, p. 13] 
G. THE SECOND CLINTON BUDGET PROPOSAL 
President Clinton unveiled an unexpected second budget proposal in the midst of 
the House and Senate conference on the budget resolution. The President's 12 June 
proposal fundamentally shifted the budget debate from a question of whether to balance 
the budget, to a question ofhow to do it and how fast. [Ref 37, p. 1715] The President's 
10 year proposal contributed $520 billion towards deficit reduction, compared to $756 
billion in the House's plan and $958 billion in the Senate's. [Ref 37, p. 1717] 
The new Clinton plan left defense largely untouched, cutting $3 billion over a 10 
year period. [Ref 37, p.1717] However, Republicans quickly dismissed the new Clinton 
proposal because of the questionable economic assumptions on which it was based. [Ref 
37, p. 1715] Consequently, while acknowledging the positive direction the President's 
new budget was heading, Congress pressed on with its own budget balancing agenda. 
H. CONFERENCE AGREEMENT 
The conference committee on the budget resolution largely split the difference 
between the House and Senate budget resolutions for defense in FY96. The conference 
agreement's solution to the large-difference in the FYDP funding between the House 
(+$70.4 billion in budget authority, +$54.2 billion in outlays) and Senate (-$10.6 billion in 
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budget authority, -$3.6 in outlays) was a compromise between the two. The conference 
committee provided an additional $7.1 billion in budget authority and $2.2 billion in 
outlays over the President's request in FY96 and a total of$24.8 billion in budget 
authority and $28.7 billion in outlays over FY96-FY01. [Ref 38, p. 63] The conference 
recommended that the additional defense funds provide for RDT &E and weapons 
procurement in FY96 and be equally split between the O&M accounts and weapons 
procurement thereafter. [Ref 38, p. 63] 
The conference committee sought to fulfill three aims: "end the decline in defense 
spending," "fill the trough" in the Administration's defense spending plans in FY96-FY98, 
and provide a "steady and increasing stream ofbudget authority" for defense. [Ref 38, p. 
63] Although the committee did increase defense funds for the FY96-FY98 period over 
the administration's request, their plan neither halted the decline in defense spending nor 
provided for increased defense dollars in future years. The conference agreement 
provided for defense to grow approximately 1 percent a year. Nonetheless, due to 
inflation, each year in the FY96-FY02 budget resolution contained lower defense spending 
than the FY95 defense budget. [Ref 38, p. 63] 
The conference agreement did, however, maintain the Senate's commitment tore-
establish "firewalls" between defense and non-defense discretionary spending for FY96-
FY98. [Ref. 19, p. 15] Under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, individual spending 
caps for defense, international, and defense programs could not be exceeded by Congress. 
In 1993, however, Congress replaced the separate caps for discretionary spending with a 
combined cap on all discretionary spending for FY94 and FY95. [Ref. 39] The conference 
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agreement sought to re-establish the individual spending caps and build a "firewall" 
between the discretionary accounts. As a result, budget cuts from defense, for example, 
could not be used to fund other discretionary programs during this period. 
While the budget resolution did not put the "firewalls" into law, it did establish a 
mechanism in the Senate to maintain the "firewalls." Any spending measure introduced in 
the Senate which violated the "firewalls" would be subject to a point of order. To override 
the point of order would require 60 votes. [Ref 40, p.25] In other words, while the 
"firewalls" erected by the Senate did not prevent shifting funds between the discretionary 
accounts, it made doing so more difficult. [Ref 38, p. 90] However, while the "firewalls" 
protected defense spending in FY96, the FY97 a_nd FY98 "firewalls" were contingent 
upon the enactment of the FY96 reconciliation bill. Because the President vetoed this 
legislation, the "firewall" protection for defense ended in FY96. [Ref 40, p.90] 
The concurrent resolution on the budget quickly passed both the House (238-193) 
and Senate (54-46). [Ref 3, p. 1899] Although the budget resolution established the 
topline figure for defense spending in FY96, the debate on what to purchase with those 
funds remained. Even before Congress passed the budget resolution, the defense 
committees in both houses began work on their legislation. 
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Table 7. Budget Resolution Alternatives for Defense, (Current Year Dollars). From 
Ref 19. 
· 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total 
Admin Reguest 
BA 257.6 253.4 259.6 266.3 276.0 286.5 NA NA 
Outlays 260.9 256.9 254.5 259.7 267.8 271.5 NA NA 
House Passed 
BA 267.3 269.3 277.3 281.3 287.3 287.3 287.2 NA 
Delta +9.7 +15.9 +17.6 +15.1 +11.3 +0.8 NA +70.4 
Outlays 265.1 265.3 265.3 271.3 279.3 279.3 279.2 NA 
Delta +4.1 +8.3 +10.8 +11.7 +11.5 +7.8 NA +54.2 
Senate Passed 
BA 257.7 253.4 259.6 266.2 276.0 275.9 275.9 NA 
Delta +0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -10.6 NA -10.6 
Outlays 261.1 257.0 254.5 259.6 267.8 267.7 269.2 NA 
Delta +0.2 +0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -3.8 NA -3.6 
Con f. 
Agreement 
BA 264.7 267.3 269.0 271.7 274.4 277.1 280.0 NA 
Delta +7.1 +13.9 +9.4 +5.4 -1.6 -9.4 NA +24.8 
Outlays 263.1 265.0 263.8 267.2 270.9 270.0 270.0 NA 
Delta +2.2 +8.1 +9.3 +7.5 +3.1 -1.5 NA +28.7 
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON FY95 DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL 
APPROPRIATIONS AND RESCISSIONS 
The supplemental appropriations and rescissions bills for the FY95 defense budget 
provided the first opportunity for the Republican majority to vote on defense in 1995. The 
debate on these bills occurred concurrently with the formulation of the larger FY96 
defense budget. Both defense and deficit hawks displayed a strong desire to modify the 
previous years' Democratic defense budget. 
This chapter provides a detailed examination of congressional action on the 
defense supplemental appropriations and rescissions bills enacted in 1995. It initially 
provides background information on the events which cause defense funding shortages. It 
discusses the funding dilemma these shortages generate in the military and how 
supplemental appropriations are used to rectify the problem. The chapter then presents 
the specific supplemental defense funding issues in 1995 which required congressional 
action. It tracks the debate on the subject from the White House request, through the 
House and Senate Appropriations Committees, on the House and Senate floor, and in the 
Conference Committee. It concludes with an analysis of what the debate on defense 
supplemental appropriations and rescissions bills contributed to the larger congressional 
debate on the FY96 defense budget. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Supplemental appropriations are those additional funds provided by Congress after 
the normal yearly budgeting process has taken place. For defense, the DoD requests 
41 
supplemental appropriations to cover additional, unbudgeted expenses it incurred during 
the fiscal year which it deems too urgent to await the next year's budget. In recent years, 
unplanned military evolutions, normally combined under the heading of"contingency 
operations," have produced most ofthese unanticipated costs. Recent examples of 
contingency operations include the disaster relief efforts in Bangladesh and peace-keeping 
operations in Bosnia. 
The military, somewhat counter-intuitively, has not historically budgeted for 
contingency operations (or even war, for that matter). Therefore, all expenses incurred 
while performing these operations must be paid for by the military out of its current 
budget. This, in tum, produces considerable financial strain on the military as it must 
short certain accounts in order to pay for the contingency operations. Recent attempts by 
the military to rectify the problem, by establishing a contingency operation budget, failed 
to gamer the requisite support in Congress. [Ref. 40, p. 5] By controlling the purse 
strings of the DoD, Congress is able to maintain a large degree of control on the 
President's use ofthe military. 
Upon surface inspection, it is difficult to understand why the military, with a FY95 
budget of $259.1 billion, would not be able to simply absorb the cost of its contingency 
operations. [Ref. 5, p 6] This seems especially simple as the military's FY95 request for 
supplemental appropriations totaled only $2.5 billion, approximately 1 percent of its 
defense budget total. However, a closer examination of the way in which the military 
must pay for these unbudgeted operations demonstrates why contingency operations 
produce such a strain on the military. 
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Contingency operations are paid for out of the military's O&M accounts. FY95 
O&M accounts represented $90.0 billion ofthe $259.1 defense budget total. The $2.5 
billion in contingency operation expenses, therefore, cons{Jmed almost 3% of this budget. 
However, most of the O&M accounts, such as those used to pay DoD civilian employees, 
cannot be tapped to fund contingency operations. Only $26 billion of the $90.0 billion 
O&M budget, the so-called flexible portion of the budget, was available for use by the 
military budgeters. Examined in this context, the $2.5 billion required for contingency 
operations now comprised 10 percent of the available budget. The problem was further 
exacerbated when one considers that late in the fiscal year only a small percentage of these 
funds were still available for use. In the fourth quarter ofFY95, the $2.5 billion needed to 
pay for the contingency operations now represented 40 percent of the military's available 
funding. Figure 4 illustrates this concept. [Ref 42, chart 6] 
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Figure 5. FY95 Contingency Operations Costs as a Percentage of Select DoD 
Budgets. From Ref 42. 
B. THE WHITE HOUSE REQUEST 
12.7 percent I 
On 6 February, 1995, President Clinton presented Congress with a request for 
FY95 supplemental defense appropriations along with his FY96 budget proposal. The 
President requested $2,556.7 million in supplemental appropriations to cover the costs of 
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contingency operations in Haiti, Rwanda, Southwest Asia, Cuba, and several other hot 
spots around the globe. In an effort to offset the costs of these appropriations, the White 
House request included $703 million in rescissions. The Administration proposed that the 
supplemental appropriations be approved as emergency funding, not subject to the 
spending cap provisions of the Budget Enforcement Act. [Ref 40, p. 2] DoD officials 
warned that if funding were not restored to the FY95 budget by 31 March, the services 
would begin canceling training and maintenance activity. [Ref 41, p. 625] 
C. HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE AND HOUSE FLOOR 
DEBATE 
Even before the President formally requested supplemental defense funding for 
FY95, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on National Security began to work on 
the bill. Appropriations Committee members in both the House and Senate felt 
considerable pressure not to increase the deficit. The House Appropriations Committee's 
senior Democrat, David Obey, D-WI, reminded his colleagues, "this is the first actual bill 
that spends money that will come to the floor since the (House) passage of the Balanced 
Budget Amendment." [Ref 41, p. 625] 
The full House Appropriations Committee quickly passed two measures to provide 
both supplemental funding and offsetting rescissions. H. R. 889 provided $3.2 billion in 
supplemental funds to the military, $2.5 billion for contingency operations and an 
additional $670 million in unrequested funding for short term readiness. The bill rescinded 
$1.5 billion from the FY95 defense budget and earmarked $360 million provided by Allies 
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for the contingency operation in Kuwait as reimbursement for the DoD. The second bill, 
H. R. 845, rescinded an additional $1.4 billion in non-defense discretionary funding. 
Taken together, the rescissions contained within the Committee's two bills fully offset the 
proposed supplemental appropriations in budget authority. Because ofthe slower 
spending rate of some of the rescinded programs, however, the bills did not fully cover the 
proposed outlays. [Ref 40, p. 1] 
The House Rules Committee subsequently incorporated the provisions of H. R. 
845 into H. R. 899. The revised House bill, H. R. 889, therefore, contained all defense 
and non-defense recissions and supplemental appropriations for FY95. Table 8 
summarizes the proposed defense supplemental appropriations and rescissions under the 
House Appropriations Conllnittee plan. 
Table 8. House Appropriations Committee Supplemental Appropriations and 
Rescissions in H. R. 889. From Ref 40 
Supplemental Funds for Contingency Operations $2,538.7 million 
Supplemental Funding for Enhanced Readiness 669.7 million 
Rescissions from DoD Funds -1,460.2 million 
Rescissions from Non-Defense Funds -1,402.1 million 
Receipts from Allies and the United Nations -360.0 million 
The full House debate on H. R. 889 began on 10 February, 1995, and focused on 
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three major issues. The $670 million provided for "readiness enhancement" ($248.7 
million for military pay raises and $421.0 million for O&M) generated a quick response 
from OMB Director Alice Rivlin. She complained that these additional defense funds 
were not related to the contingency operations, and therefore, should not be categorized 
as emergency funding by the House. Secretary of Defense William Perry attacked the 
unrequested monies on the grounds that the DoD had higher priority programs to fund. 
He cited the unfunded pay raises for civilian DoD employees as an example.[Ref 40, p. 5] 
The $1.4 billion of non-defense rescissions also caused a great deal of debate on 
the House floor. Congressman David Obey protested that the use of non-defense 
rescissions to pay for defense amounted to an actual increase for the defense budget. His 
amendment to require all the rescission dollars to come from within the DoD was rejected 
by the House. 
The specific programs eliminated or reduced by the rescissions contained in H. R. 
889 generated a large amount of debate. The proposed $502 million rescission to the 
Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP), the $80 million cut in the Nunn-Lugar 
program to dismantle nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, and the $110 million 
reduction in aid for the resettlement of Russian officers, all provoked a heated response 
from Administration officials. They argued that the TRP provided dual-use technologies 
for both the private and public sector and contributed to the technological superiority of 
American weapons systems. Administration officials also maintained that the Nunn-Lugar 
program and aid for Russian officer housing constituted promises to Russian President 
Boris Y eltsin for American assistance moving his country toward a Democratic society. 
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[Ref 40, p. 6] 
Despite these protests, on 22 Feb 1995, H. R. 889 passed the House, 265-165. 
The only successful amendment to the House Appropriations Committee bill was the 
removal of supplemental funding for an $18 million landfill in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
After the House had passed its version of the measure, the Senate Appropriations 
Committee began its debate on H. R. 889. 
D. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE AND SENATE FLOOR 
DEBATE 
The Senate Appropriations Committee passed its version ofH. R. 889 on 2 March, 
1995. The Committee approved $1,935.4 million in supplemental appropriations ($621.3 
million less than the House-passed version). The Committee offset its supplemental 
appropriations by the $297.1 million expected from the U.N. and Allies. [Ref 40, p. 7] It 
contended that the funding requested by the President, but not appropriated by the 
Committee, was not urgently needed by the services and could be accommodated within 
the FY96 defense budget. [Ref 43, p. 1034] Additionally, the Committee did not provide 
readiness enhancement funds and refused to designate its supplemental funds as 
emergency appropriations. [Ref 40, p. 7] 
The Senate Appropriations Committee rescinded $1,963.9 million in DoD funding 
($503.7 million more than the House) and an additional $1,536.0 million in non-defense 
programs ($133.8 more than the House). However, the Committee differed from the 
House in the programs it rescinded. It cut $200 million ($302 million less than the House) 
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from the TRP and rejected cuts in both the Nunn-Lugar program and Russian officer 
resettlement program. [Ref 40, p. 7] Table 9 summarizes the Senate Appropriations 
Committee's version of the bill. 
Table 9. Senate Appropriations Committee's Supplemental Appropriations and 
Rescissions in H. R. 889. From Ref 40. 
Supplemental Funds for Contingency Operations 
Rescissions from DoD 





- 1,536.0 million===:::!! 
Senate Floor debate on H. R. 889 began on 7 March, but other legislation delayed 
the bills' passage until March 16. Although the Senate generally expressed support for the 
bill, Senators Daniel Inouye, D-Ill, and Sam Nunn, D-GA, noted that fully offsetting 
defense supplemental appropriations with cuts in defense might set a dangerous precedent. 
They argued, "In the future ... senior officers may be reluctant to support the use ofU. S. 
Forces ... because the costs of any action will have to be offset by reductions in current 
programs." [Ref 40, p. 10] 
An amendment offered by Senator McCain to bring the Senate's $200 million TRP 
rescission in line with the House's $502 million cut failed, 22-77. Other amendments, 
however, were more successful. Most of the amendments to H. R. 889 simply substituted 
rescissions in favored programs with cuts in other programs with less support. Other 
amendments to the measure included a controversial rescission in funding for the 
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enforcement of the Endangered Species Act and a restriction on civil nuclear cooperation 
with Russia unless it halted sales of nuclear reactor components to Iran. H. R. 889 easily 
passed the Senate by a vote of97-3. [Ref. 40, p. 11] 
E. CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ACTION 
The House and Senate Conference Committee achieved a compromise which 
satisfied both defense and deficit hawks. The conference agreement provided for the full 
$2.5 billion supplemental defense appropriation, plus an additional $561 million readiness 
enhancement to cover military pay raises. Contributions from the U.N. and Allies 
remained earmarked for defense coffers. [Ref 43, p. 1034] 
The rescissions contained within the compromise bill, however, did more than 
offset the supplemental appropriations. The Committee rescinded $2.36 billion from the 
DoD, including $300 million from TRP and $20 million from the Nunn-Lugar program. 
The conference agreement also provided for $1. 12 billion in cuts to non-defense 
programs. Taken together, the supplemental appropriations and offsetting rescissions 
produced a net $746 million reduction in the FY95 budget. Table 10 summarizes the 
cq_~ference agreement. [Ref 43, p. 1035] 
50 
Table 10. Summary of Conference A~reement on H. R. 889. From Ref. 43. 
Supplemental Funds for Contingency Operations $2.48 billion 
Supplemental Funds for Readiness Enhancement 561 million 
Receipts from Allies and U. N. -297 million 
Rescissions from DoD 
-2.36 billion 
Rescissions from Non-Defense Programs -1.12 billion 
Total 
-746 million 
On April 6th, 1995, H. R. 889 quickly passed the House, 343-80. The same day, 
the Senate passed the measure on a voice vote. Despite reservations, the President signed 
the bill into law on 10 April, 1995. [Ref. 5, p. 15] 
The debate on the FY95 defense supplemental appropriations and rescissions bill 
provided early insight into many of the issues which would later dominate the FY96 
defense budget debate. It showcased the early sparing over defense spending between 
deficit hawks and defense hawks. The bill demonstrated the level of support the defense 
hawks could expect within each house of Congress. Lastly, the defense supplemental 
appropriations and rescissions bill served as a interesting prelude to the larger debate on 
spending programs and policies within the FY96 defense bills. 
51 
52 
V. CONGRESSIONAL FORMULATION OF THE FY96 DEFENSE 
AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS BILLS 
This chapter examines the evolution of the FY96 defense authorization and 
appropriations bills within Congress following the conclusion of the defense debate during 
the formulation of the budget resolution. It begins its chronology in May with debate in 
the House and Senate on the authorization bills in committee. The chapter tracks the 
House and Senate authorization and appropriations bills through the defense committees, 
on the House and Senate floor, and in the conference committees. It examines several of 
the major issues which fueled the defense debate and analyzes the compromises associated 
with the passage of the legislation. 
A. FY96 AUTHORIZATION BILL 
1. House National Security Committee Action 
Even before the House and Senate finalized their FY96 budget resolution and 
provided a topline spending figure for defense, the House National Security Committee 
(HNSC) was already busy formulating its FY96 defense authorization bill. The 
Committee's bill (H. R. 1530) authorized $267.3 billion in FY96 budget authority, $9.5 
billion more than the President's request. [Ref 44, p. 1519] The bulk ofthe additional 
monies provided by the Committee funded either additional weapons procurement or sped 
up current weapons _development. Overall, the Committee provided an additional $4.4 
billion for procurement, $1.6 billion for RDT &E, $2.8 billion for O&M, $25 5 million for 
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military personnel, and $600 million for military construction and family housing. [Ref 23, 
p. 1662] Table 11 details the major procurement programs added by the HNSC to the 
President's defense budget request. 
Table 11. Major Additional Procurement Programs Funded by the HNSC. From 
Ref 23. 
Marine Amphibious Landing Ship (LPD-1 7) $974 million 
Additional Theater Missile Defense Funds $763 million 
2 "Roll-on, Roll-off' Cargo Ships $600 million 
6 F-15s, 6 F-16s, and AV-8B Upgrades $585 million 
Components for 2 B-2s $553 million 
Commanche Helicopter Development $100 million 
Surprisingly, the Committee also provided additional funds to slow the decline in 
the size of the force structure . The $112 miilion in military personnel funds added by the 
Committee would allow the Secretary of Defense to keep an additional 7,500 military 
personnel on duty. The Committee cited certain units where there had been a "particularly 
heavy demand in recent years, such as Patriot missile crews and AWACS airborne radar 
operators." [Ref 23, p. 1664] 
The HNSC, however, cut as well as added programs from the President's request. 
The Committee deleted $1.5 billion to finance a third Seawolf-class submarine. Instead, it 
provided $550 million to lengthen the second Seawolf-class submarine and an additional 
$300 million in smaller construction projects designed to keep Electric Boat, the 
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submarine's builder, in business. [Ref 23, p. 1662] The HNSC also cut $171 million from 
the President's $371 million request for the Nunn-Lugar program and canceled funding 
entirely for the TRP. [Ref 44, p. 1519] 
The Committee proposed changes to other military related, but socially 
contentious issues. One provision of the defense bill would require HIV infected military 
personnel be discharged from the service. Supporters of the provision argued that because 
HIV infected personnel cannot be deployed, operational readiness is affected as healthy 
military members must spend more time at sea or stationed overseas. Critics charged that 
the measure was punitive in nature and that HIV infected personnel "did not present an 
adverse affect on military readiness." [Ref 44, p. 1522] 
The HNSC also sought to revive the ban on abortions performed overseas for 
female service members and dependents. Although the provision affected only a small 
number ofwomen each year, supporters of the measure hoped to use the proposal to 
advance their position in the larger congressional abortion debate. Critics of the measure 
charged that the bill denied women stationed overseas the same rights as those within the 
United States. [Ref 44, p. 1522] 
On 24 May 1995, despite several contentious issues, the defense authorization bill 
passed the HNSC with wide spread support, 48-3. Only isolated, but vocal critics of the 
measure such as Congressman Ronald Dellums voiced objections. Most Committee 
members realized, however, that the spending programs and policy issues contained in the 
bill would likely provoke considerable debate on the House floor. [Ref 23, p. 1659] 
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2. House Floor Debate 
On 15 June 1995, the House easily passed its version of the defense authorization 
bill on a 300-126 vote. The bill authorized $267.3 billion in budget authority for defense 
in FY96, approximately four percent above the President's request. [Ref 45, p. 1755] 
Additional funding for two programs dominated much of the House debate. 
Congressmen John Kasich and Ronald Dellums led the effort to kill the funding for 
additional B-2 bomber production and cap the bomber fleet at 20 aircraft. The B-2's 
prime contractor, Northrop-Grumman, offered to sell the Air Force an additional20 
planes at a cost of $11 billion. Critics of the plan, however, charged that the total cost of 
the aircraft was likely to be $20 billion plus an additional $11 billion to operate them for 
20 years. Congressman Dellums argued that "precision guided munitions put more 
munitions on target at less risk. .. and at a cheaper cost" than the B-2. [Ref 45, p. 1755] 
An amendment to kill additional B-2 funding was defeated narrowly on a 203-219 vote. 
[Ref 45, p 1757] 
Democrats also attacked the additional funding for theater missile defense (TMD) 
on both funding and policy grounds. At the heart of the TMD debate was the concern that 
the additional funding might violate tenets ofthe 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union. Congressman John 
Spratt, D-S.C., believed that the program jeopardized the Russian parliament's ratification 
of the START II Treaty to eliminate 5,000 nuclear warheads. He argued, "We cannot 
build a missile defense that will effectively shoot down so many Russian missiles ... so 
cheaply as the ratification of START II, why put it in jeopardy?" [Ref 45, p. 1757] 
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However, supporters ofthe TMD program such as Congressman Duncan Hunter, R-CA, 
argued that" the problem is that we made that (ABM) treaty with one other nation. Today 
there are dozens of nations who never signed it who are developing missiles." [Ref 45, p. 
1757] Congressman Spratt's amendment to kill the additional TMD funding failed, 185-
242. [Ref 45, p. 1757] 
The House amended the HNSC's bill to link the $200 million provided for the 
Nunn-Lugar program to presidential verification that Russia had terminated its biological 
weapons program. The House also adopted the so-called burden sharing amendment 
designed make U.S. allies pay for the most ofthe cost of stationing U.S. troops on their 
soil by the end of the decade. It also deleted a $50 million nuclear reactor which had been 
targeted by a taxpayer lobby. [Re. 45, p. 1757] While the House was voting on the 
defense authorization bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee was beginning 
deliberation on its version of the bill. 
3. Senate Armed Services Committee Action 
On 29 June 1995, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) approved its 
version of the FY96 defense authorization bill (S 1 026), 18-3. The measure authorized 
$264.7 billion for defense, $7 billion more than the President's request and the maximum 
allowed under the recently adopted concurrent resolution on the budget. [Ref 46, p. 
1942] Overall, the SASC's authorization bill added $5,291 million for procurement, 
$1,668 million for RDT&E, and $200 million to military personnel. [Ref 47, p. 2286] It 
reduced, however, the O&M account by $211 million from the President's request. While 
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most of the funds added by the defense authorization committees in both the House and 
Senate went for additional weapons procurement, the committees sharply split over the 
specific weapons programs to fund. [Ref 46, p. 1942] 
Unlike the House, the SASC approved the President's $1.5 billion request for a 
third Seawolf-class submarine. Interestingly, the Committee waived the full-funding 
requirement for the submarine's purchase. The Committee also approved a $1.3 billion 
Marine helicopter assault ship (LHD-7) and rejected the House's LPD-17. Table 12 
details the major procurement programs added by the SASC to the President's request. 
[Ref 47, pp. 2285-2291] 
Table 12. Major Additional Procurement Programs Funded by the SASC. From 
Ref 47. 
Marine Helicopter Assault Ship (LHD-7) $1.3 billion 
12 Navy F/A-18s $650 million 
Additional Theater Missile Defense Funds $770 million 
2 Navy destroyers (partial payment) $650 million 
A V -8B upgrades $270 million 
Commanche Development $174 million 
JAST program $175 million 
The SASC broke with the House and authorized $23 8 million for the TRP and 
$365 million of the $371 million requested for the Nunn-Lugar program. The Committee 
also authorized $125 million to fund anticipated contingency operations in FY96. While 
the $125 million fell far short of the $1.2 billion request, it did mark the first time the 
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Committee authorized funds for contingency operations before the expenses from the 
contingency operations were incurred. [Ref 47, p. 2290] 
While the SASC authorized additional funds for several major programs it also cut 
funding for other high-visibility procurement programs. Most notably, the Committee 
rejected funding for the B-2, additional F-15s and F-16s, and the Marine LPD-17. 
Although the SASC's Subcommittee on Strategic Forces recommended adding $500 
million to purchase B-2 components for additional B-2 production, the full Committee 
rejected the recommendation, 13-8. [Ref 46, p. 1942] 
The SASC made smaller cuts in funding authorization for U. N. operations, 
humanitarian assistance, and other non-defense programs contained within the defense 
budget. The expected windfall from the elimination of these programs proved elusive. For 
example, the Committee cut only $20 million of the $1.2 billion budget request for 
environmental programs. [Ref 47, p. 2291] 
The SASC demonstrated a preference "for weapons over-treaties" in the 
formulation of its authorization bill. [Ref 47, p. 2285] The Committee added to the 
authorization bill a "non-binding provision declaring it be the U. S. policy to deploy by 
2003 an anti-missile system located at more than one U. S. site." [Ref 46, p. 1942] 
Senate critics charged that the provision would goad Russia into a more confrontational 
stance on a range of issues. The Committee also ordered the Energy Department to 
conduct small "sub-nuclear" test explosions to ensure that aging U. S. nuclear weapons 
had not lost their punch. [Ref 47, p.2285] Critics of the provision claimed the measure 
would undermine efforts to conclude a multi-lateral treaty banning nuclear test explosions. 
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Overall, the SASC's FY96 defense authorization bill would "robust up the 
administration's program, rather than launch a dramatic multi-year program that could fall 
by the wayside." [Ref 47, p.2285] Reservations about support for the measure in the 
full Senate tempered the SASC's enthusiasm for bolstering defense. 
4. Senate Floor Debate 
On 6 September 1995, the Senate passed its version of the FY96 defense 
authorization bill, 64-34, following nearly a month ofheated debate and tense 
negotiations. The Senate measure authorized $265.3 billion for defense, slightly more 
than the SASC's bill. The measure passed only after Senate Republicans and Democrats 
reached a compromise on the proposed anti-missile defense system. [Ref 48, p. 2731] 
Disagreement over language in the Senate authorization bill regarding the 
deployment of a anti-missile defense system provided the largest stumbling block to the 
bill's passage. The original SASC bill mandated deployment of a multi-site anti-missile 
defense system by the year 2003. Critics within both the Senate and Clinton 
Administration immediately attacked the plan. President Clinton's National Security 
Advisor, Anthony Lake, in a letter to the Senate~ wrote that he and other presidential 
advisors would recommend that the President veto the authorization bill unless the 
unacceptable portions of the missile defense provisions were removed. [Ref 49, p. 2380] 
Critics within the Senate called the system unnecessarily provocative toward Russia and 
threatened a filibuster. [Ref 48, p. 2731] 
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Supporters of the anti-missile defense system believed the system would prevent 
rogue nations from attacking the United States or blackmailing it with weapons of mass 
destruction. Supporters noted that the measure did not violate the ABM Treaty with 
Russia as the Treaty covered only provisions for defense against strategic missiles. The 
Treaty did not, however, define the term strategic missile. The distinction used in the bill 
defined strategic missiles as those with a range of greater than 3 500 kilometers and a top 
speed of greater than five kilometers per second. The proposed anti-missile system 
protected only against shorter range theater ballistic missiles. [Ref. 50, p. 2453] Senator 
Warner commented that the reason the Republicans sought to put the proposal into law 
was "to prevent the Clinton administration from IJlaking the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 
in effect, a theater missile defense treaty." [Ref. 49, p. 2382] 
After lengthy negotiations, Senator William Cohen~ R-ME, proposed a successful 
compromise measure to end the debate. His amendment expressed the Sense of Congress 
that the multi-site deployment policy ofthe anti-missile defense system could be carried 
out without violating the ABM Treaty. The amendment revised the mandatory 
deployment of the system by 2003 to merely the capability to deploy the system by 2003. 
Additionally, the amendment required congressional approval ofthe system as both 
"affordable and operationally effective" before being fielded. The Senate agreed to the 
amendment 85-13. [Ref. 50, p. 2453] 
In large, the Senate adopted the recommendations contained within the SASC bill. 
The Senate did, however, increase overall defense funding. Small programs, favored by 
individual members, found their way back into the defense budget. Although opposed by 
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most Democrats, the Senate also retained the $50 million program to fund small scale 
nuclear testing. While the authorization bill's passage marked another milestone in the 
Republican's efforts to increase defense spending, the large disparity between the House 
and Senate versions of the defense bill, as well the continued threat of eventually veto by 
the President, remained. [Ref. 48, p. 2733] 
5. Early Conference Committee Debate 
The authorization conference began on 7 September 1995 with the two 
congressional houses deeply divided on both policy and spending issues. Differences over 
abortion and theater missile defense dominated most of the early debate. As an agreement 
between the conferees proved elusive and the months wore on, the relevancy of the 
defense authorization process was called into question. [Ref 51, p. 7] 
Conference committee members split sharply over several spending issues. As the 
debate over spending levels heated up, the rhetoric between the congressional houses 
intensified. For example, the House voted 415-2, to instruct its conferees to stick by its 
$94.7 billion O&M funding total and reject the Senate's level of$91.7 billion..[Ref. 52, p. 
2926] In the Senate, conference member Senator Sam Nunn responded that unless the 
Senate's language on theater missile defense was adopted, the conference would end. As . 
the authorization debate wore on with little progress, committee members and staffers 
expressed fiustration and despair. [Ref 51, p. 7] 
Blame for the indecision focussed largely on the authorization Committee 
chairmen, Senator Strom Thurmond and Congressman Floyd Spence. Critics charged that 
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the two relied largely on their inexperienced staffers to drive the process to conclusion. 
Several conference members expressed their displeasure with the lack of a conference 
agreement. "It's very embarrassing," commented Senator John McCain. He noted that 
defense appropriators had become the ones setting defense policy as a consequence. [Ref. 
51, p. 7] The conferees failure to reach a compromise on the authorization bill would mark 
the first time since the establishment of the Committee in 1961 that authorizers failed to 
reach an agreement. While the conferees eventually did reach an agreement (discussed in 
chapter 6), the government shutdown briefly interrupted the defense debate. 
By late September, only two of the thirteen annual appropriations bills had been 
approved by Congress and signed into law by the President. To keep the government 
functioning after the start of the new fiscal year, the President and congressional 
leadership negotiated a 44 day continuing resolution (CR). [Ref. 53, p. 3439] In the 
additional time provided by the CR, Congress and the President hoped to work out their 
differences and come to an agreement on the FY96 spending measures. However, by 13 
November 1995, the day the CR expired, no additional appropriation bills had been signed 
into law. Without any spending authority, most government departments curtailed all but 
their most essential activities. The DoD, lacking an appropriations bill, adopted 
emergency measures to enable it to function. Chapter VI discusses the details ofDoD 
spending under the CR. [Ref. 54, p. 3440] 
During the formulation of the annual defense budget bills, the defense 
authorization process normally precedes the development of the defense appropriations 
bill. The preparation ofFY96 defense budget, however, proved highly unusual in that the 
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defense appropriations process concluded before the defense authorization bill had been 
signed into law. Because of this, this chapter temporarily leaves the defense authorization 
debate and takes up the defense appropriations bill. Chapter 6 returns to the defense 
authorization debate. 
B. FY96 APPROPRIATIONS BILL 
1. House Appropriations Committee Action 
The House Appropriations Committee's FY96 defense appropriations bill (H. R. 
2126), as expected, closely resembled the House's FY96 defense authorization bill. The 
Committee approved the $244 billion measure o~ a voice vote on 25 July 1995. The bill 
added $7.78 billion to the President's defense budget request. Although the bill closely 
resembled the House authorization bill passed a month and a half earlier, it provided yet 
another opportunity for both supporters and critics of the various provisions contained 
within the measure another chance to affect defense legislation. [Ref 55, p. 2292] 
Almost three-quarters of the $7.78 billion added by the Committee went to fund 
additional weapons procurement and RDT&E. The House Committee's bill faulted the 
Clinton defense plan, claiming it was "heavily weighted toward maintaining current 
readiness ... at the expense of necessary modernization and development." [Ref 55, p. 
2292] Still; the bill did provide $784 million in additional O&M funds. It did not, 
however, fund the additional 7,500 personnel contained in the military personnel account 
ofthe authorization bill. [Ref 55, p. 2294] 
The Committee appropriated an additional $600 million for TMD, $540 for B-2 
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components, and most of the other major programs contained within the authorization bill. 
Curiously, the Committee also funded a handful of programs not contained in the 
authorization bill such as six additional AH-1 helicopters provided to the Marine Corps. 
Still, while the majority of programs funded through the appropriations bill could be found 
in the authorization legislation, the House Appropriations Committee did include several 
new provisions in its legislation to address the budget problems caused by contingency 
operations. [Ref 55, pp. 2294-2295] 
The Committee added $64 7 million to the President's defense budget request in 
order to cover the cost oftwo long running contingency operations in Iraq. Both 
Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq and Southern Watch in Southern Iraq had 
been underway for over four years and showed no signs of ending anytime soon. The 
Pentagon contended, however, that it was too difficult to predict when the end of these 
operations might occur and, therefore, that it was impossible to budget for them. The 
Committee rejected the Pentagon's argument and stipulated that the use of the additional 
funds provided by the Committee would be contingent upon the Pentagon budgeting for 
these operations in its FY97 budget request. [Ref 55, p. 2294] 
2. House Floor Debate 
On 7 September 1995, the House passed the FY96 defense appropriations bill (H. 
R. 2126), 294-125. The $244 billion spending measure passed the House largely 
unscathed. Except for the sharp divide within the House over the B-2, social and political 
issues contained within the measure dominated most of the House debate. [Ref 56, p. 
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2728] 
The narrow 16 vote margin which ensured the B-2's inclusion in the FY96 defense 
authorization bill seemed ripe for attack by critics of the program. Led by Congressman 
Ronald Dellums, John Kasich, and Republican freshman, Mark Neumann, R-WI, critics of 
additional B-2 funding mounted a concerted effort to kill the appropriation provision for 
the program. Despite intense lobbying, their amendment to eliminate funding for the B-2 
failed on a close 210-213 vote. [Ref 56, p. 2229] 
The abortion issue figured prominently in the House floor debate on the defense 
appropriations bill as well as the authorization bill. Congressman Robert Dornan 
successfully added an amendment to the Committee bill which prohibited abortions at 
overseas military bases. After heated floor debate, Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro, D-
CT, and a coalition of other Democratic women failed to overturn the measure. Their 
amendment failed in a 194-224 vote. [Ref 56, p. 2728] 
Congressman Mark Neumann sponsored an amendment to deny funds for U.S. 
troop deployments to Bosnia unless the President received prior approval from Congress. 
The White House attacked this amendment as undermining the power of the President to 
function as the commander-in-chief While Congressman Neumann acknowledged the 
right of the President to deploy troops, he believed that since the Congress controlled the 
purse .strings, it should be consulted before the President dispatched troops to this 
troubled region. [Ref 56, p. 2730] 
Congressman John Murtha, D-PA, the ranking minority member ofthe House 
Appropriations National Security Subcommittee, convinced Congressman Neumann that 
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the President should not have to seek congressional approval to use American forces to 
evacuate U. S. allies serving as peace-keepers in Bosnia. The House adopted the modified 
Neumann amendment on a voice vote. Congressional concern over the President's use of 
American troops in the Balkans foreshadowed a major showdown with the President in 
the months ahead. [Ref 56, p. 2730] 
3. Senate Appropriations Committee Action 
On 28 July 1995, three days after the House Appropriations Committee approved 
its FY96 defense appropriations legislation, the Senate Appropriations Committee passed 
its version ofthe bill (S 1087) unanimously, 28-0. The $242.7 billion defense bill added 
$6.4 billion to the President's FY96 defense budget proposal. The Senate Appropriations 
Committee's action came two days after its Subcommittee on Defense approved the bill 
on a voice vote with "little debate, and several statements about the need to stem the tide 
of deep reduction in military spending and preserve the defense industrial base." [Ref 56, 
p. 2295] 
Notably, the Committee provided no additional funds for B-2 production or 
peacekeeping operations. Instead, the bill provided for additional F-15, F-16, and C-17 
aircraft production and funded the third Seawolf-class submarine. The Committee rejected 
steps taken by House authorizers to partially fund two additional Aegis destroyers and 
provided $3.6 billion ($1.4 billion more than requested) for a total offour ships. [Ref 56, 
p. 2295] 
Several Senators on the Committee questioned the wisdom of not funding the 
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peacekeeping operations. Senator Frank Lautenberg, D-NJ, led an effort to prevent the 
inevitable request by the military for supplemental appropriations by funding the known 
contingency operations in advance. He noted that the emergency funding designation 
usually given to defense supplemental appropriations risked increasing the federal deficit. 
The Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense, 
Senator Ted Stevens, R-AK, acknowledged the problem created by the contingency 
operations but did not support the provision. [Ref. 55, p. 2295] 
4. Senate Floor Debate 
The Senate completed work on its version of the FY96 defense appropriations bill 
(S 1087) on 5 September 1995. The Senate approved the measure on a 62-35 vote along 
party lines. Four Republican senators, including Senator John McCain, joined 31 
Democrats in opposing the legislation. Senator McCain cited the numerous unrequested 
"pork" projects added to the bill for his "nay" vote. While the Senate's version of the 
FY96 defense appropriations bill did not comply with the President's request, it was more 
palatable to the administration than the House's version ofthe bill. [Ref. 57, p. 2732] 
The Senate enacted no significant changes to the Senate Appropriations 
Committee's bill. Senator John McCain's amendment to remove $365 million in 
unrequested projects failed on a voice vote. The administration, however, voiced its 
concern that the unrequested additions to several defense programs would force a funding 
dilemma down the road. Pentagon Comptroller, John Hamre, commented that "the 
pressure to put all the additional things [in the defense budget] will still be in force [even 
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if] the top line comes down." [Ref. 57, p. 2732] 
5. Conference Committee Action 
House and Senate negotiators reached an agreement on the FY96 defense 
appropriations bill (H. R. 2126) on 22 September 1995. The bill's $243.04 billion 
conformed to the revised budget allocation provided to the conferees in the midst of its 
negotiations. The compromise bill provided the Pentagon $868 million less than the 
House measure and $556 more than the Senate version of the bill. Still, the crux ofthe 
negotiations seemed to be how much funding Congress could add to the defense budget 
without drawing a presidential veto. [Ref. 58, 2926] 
When confronted with difficult choices between major defense programs, the 
Committee usually opted for a compromise which ensured the funding ofboth programs. 
The Committee approved both the additional $493 million for continued B-2 production 
and $700 million for partial payment on the third Seawolf-class submarine. The 
Committee's compromise plan included an additional $470 million for F-15 and F-16 
production as well as full funding for both the LHD-7 and the LPD-17 amphibious ships. 
The Committee also funded $195 ofthe requested $500 million for TRP and $300 million 
of the requested $371 Nunn-Lugar program. [Ref. 58, p. 2726] 
The Conference Committee watered down the House provision barring abortions 
at military hospitals overseas. The Committee's compromise tied the adoption ofthe ban 
on military abortions abroad to the enactment of a similar ban contained in the FY96 
defense authorization bill. The Committee also revised the House provision preventing 
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the President from deploying American forces to Bosnia without congressional consent to 
a non-binding provision expressing the sense of Congress. Table 13 details the funding 
differences between the President's request, House and Senate bills, and the conference 
agreement. [Ref 59, p. 3015] 
Table 13. Comparison of Funding Totals for FY96 Defense Appropriations (In 
Millions of Dollars). From Ref 59. 
Clinton Request House Bill Senate Bill Conference Report 
Military Personnel $68,670 $69,232 $68,881 $69,054 
O&M $80,800 $81,484 $79,941 $81,553 
Procurement $38,662 $42,876 $44,461 $44,089 
RDT&E $34,332 $35,880 $35,474 $36,430 
Other $322 $277 $344 $337 
Total $236,344 $243,998 $242,684 $243,251 
6. House Rejection of the Conference Agreement 
On 29 September 1995, the House soundly rejected the Conference Committee 
FY96 defense appropriations bill. The House killed the measure on a 151-267 vote. As 
expected, most Democrats voted against the spending measure. Surprisingly, however, 
nearly two-thirds of the House Republicans also voted "nay." GOP opposition to the bill 
centered on the measure's abortion compromise. [Ref 59, p. 3013] 
Led by Congressmen, Christopher Smith, R-NJ, Robert Dornan, R-CA, and Henry 
Hyde, R-IL, House conservatives attacked they bill they claimed had been gutted in an 
attempt to appease the White House. Because the ban on abortions in the defense 
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appropriations bill hinged upon the enactment of a similar provision within the defense 
authorization bill, most Republicans believed the provision would never become law. The 
stalled defense authorization bill threatened to make the abortion provision in the defense 
appropriations bill meaningless. Despite the vehement protests ofHouse Appropriations 
Committee Chairman, Congressman Robert Livingston, R-LA, most Republicans 
remained steadfast in their opposition to the measure. Congressman Robert Doman 
insisted that the abortion issue was too important to subordinate to other defense 
concerns. [Ref 59, p. 3013] 
At this juncture of the debate, the defense hawks' prospects of gaining increased 
funding for defense seemed dim. In addition to the bill's problems within Congress, the 
measure seemed to be in jeopardy of a White House veto. In a letter to the Speaker ofthe 
House dated 29 September 1995, OMB Director Alice Rivlin wrote that the 
administration "simply cannot allocate nearly $7 billion more for defense" while other 
programs went underfunded. Soundly defeated, the House sent the defense appropriations 
bill back to conference. [Ref 59, p. 3013] 
7. Conference Committee Action Part II 
Because of the rejection of the FY96 defense appropriations bill by the House, 
House and Senate negotiators reconvened to rework the measure. Compromise between 
House and Senate negotiators on the abortion issue, however, proved elusive. House 
conferees proposed to resolve the debate by flying women at overseas bases back to the 
United States so they could obtain abortions at private hospitals. Senate negotiators 
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rejected this proposal. They countered with a proposal to simply bar the use of federal 
funds to perform abortions overseas unless the women's life was at stake or in cases of 
rape or incest. [Ref 61, p. 3550] 
House negotiators opposed the Senate provision on the grounds that women intent 
on having an abortions would produce spurious claims of rape or incest. House conferees 
sought to allow abortions in case of rape or incest only if the women reported the crime to 
military authorities. Calling the House provision an "insult to women," Senate negotiators 
rejected the House demands and offered to include instead the so-called Hyde language. 
[Ref 61, p. 3550] 
The Hyde language, included in other appropriations measures, allowed privately 
funded abortions overseas in cases of rape or incest, as well as to save the life of the 
mother. It omitted the requirement that the women report the rape or incest to military 
authorities. House negotiators accepted this compromise language and most GOP 
abortion-opponents in the House voted for this version ofthe bill. [Ref 61, p. 3550] 
In addition to new abortion language, the new conference report transferred $13 7 
million from various RDT &E programs to the Army's military personnel accounts. It also 
provided $2.2 billion to build three Aegis destroyers instead ofthe two destroyers funded 
at the same amount. A last minute addition by the conferees added a $13.6 million 
research grant to the National Center for Advanced Technologies. [Ref 60, p.3] 
Following a month of tense negotiations, the conferees reached a compromise 
they believed would be acceptable to both houses of Congress. Both the House and 
Senate approved this amended conference agreement on 16 November, 1995, on votes of 
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270-158 and 59-39, respectively. [Ref 60, p. 3] Despite congressional approval ofthe 
FY96 defense appropriations bill, Democrats predicted a presidential veto. The end of the 
44 day CR and the congressional turmoil which followed provided a brief lull in the debate 
over the defense bills. [Ref 60, p. 3] 
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VI. CONCLUSION OF THE FY96 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION AND 
APPROPRIATIONS BILL DEBATE 
This chapter continues the examination of the evolution of the FY96 defense 
authorization and appropriations bills. It resumes its chronology in October during which 
the government functioned under a continuing resolution (CR) enacted to enable the 
government to operate after the start of the new fiscal year. This chapter examines 
defense spending during the first CR, the six day funding gap, the second CR, and the 
third CR during which the President signed the FY96 defense appropriations bill into law. 
The chapter then resumes the defense authorization debate in Congress. It tracks the 
debate on the defense authorization legislation on the House and Senate floor and with the 
White House. It records the compromises enacted by Congress to gain the President's 
signature and complete action on defense funding legislation for FY96. 
A. DEFENSE SPENDING UNDER THE FY96 CONTINUING 
RESOLUTIONS AND FUNDING GAP 
Continuing resolutions provide temporary funding for federal agencies until their 
regular appropriations for the fiscal year are enacted. [Ref 62, p. 1] Continuing 
resolutions are not a new government phenomenon. The government enacted continuing 
resolutions in 13 of the past 15 years prior to FY96. In late September 1995, senior 
congressional leaders and the White House produced compromise legislation to enable the 
federal government to continue to function while they worked to pass the eleven 
remaining FY96 appropriations bills. [Ref 54, p. 3440] This CR gave Congress and the 
President an additional44 days, until 13 November 1995, to work out their differences. 
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Because the FY96 defense appropriations bill had not been signed by the President by 1 
October 1995, it also fell under the spending controls of the first CR. 
1. The First FY96 Continuing Resolution 
The stated goal of the authors of the first FY96 CR (PL 104-31) was to provide 
Congress and the President additional time to work out their differences on the eleven 
remaining FY96 appropriations bills. The first CR did little to force the President's hand 
on other larger budget issues. The CR provided funding authorization and established 
spending restrictions for the DoD during this six-week time frame. [Ref 62, p. 3442] 
The first CR authorized continued funding for those defense programs found in the 
previous year's defense appropriations bill and included in both versions of the House and 
Senate FY96 defense appropriations bills. If there were differences in the funding levels in 
these bills, the CR prescribed spending at the lowest of these three amounts. The military 
personnel accounts, most O&M accounts, and established RDT &E and procurement 
programs continued to receive their funding under this provision of the CR. [Ref 63, p. 
279] 
Defense programs, included in only one version of the House or Senate bill and not 
requested by the President, received funding at half the rate established by that house. The 
first CR also prohibited the DoD from initiating new programs, that is, programs not 
found in previous defense bills. This provision delayed construction on the LPD-17 and 
other major new procurement programs added by Congress. If Congress did not include 
in its bills an established defense program requested by the President, that program 
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continued to be funded at 90 percent of its FY95 rate. Several small environmental 
programs which Congress removed from its versions of the FY96 defense appropriations 
bill continued to receive funding under this provision. [Ref. 63, p. 280] 
Any defense spending conducted during the CR counted against that defense 
program's spending total for the fiscal year. In other words, the money provided by the 
CR did not increase the total amount of funding available to the DoD. Likewise, if a 
provision of the CR initially denied or reduced funding for a particular defense program, 
the approved program recovered its lost funding once the President signed the defense 
appropriations bill into law. [Ref. 63, p. 280] 
By the end of the grace period provided by the first CR, Congress and the 
President still had not resolved their differences on the eleven remaining FY96 
appropriations bills or the FY96 reconciliation bill. In order to stave off a government 
shutdown, a second CR needed quick approval. Applying more pressure during these 
negotiations, the GOP-controlled Congress included a provision in the second CR which 
mandated the enactment of a seven year balanced budget using numbers scored by CBO. 
President Clinton initially balked at the provision and refused to sign the second CR. With 
neither the President nor Congress willing to blink in their budget showdown, most 
agencies in the government shut down all but their most essential operations. [Ref. 62, p. 
3442] 
2. The Six-Day Funding Gap 
Lack of either an appropriations bill or a CR forced the first government shut 
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down since President Bush faced offwith Congress in 1990. [Ref 64, p. 5] The 
Republicans remained adamant in their demand for a seven year balanced budget, but the 
President refused to make the cuts necessary in several entitlement programs to bring 
about the required reductions. For the DoD, the shut down did not affect most military 
members. They remained on duty and continued to receive their pay. Most DoD-
civilians, however, were temporarily furloughed during the funding gap. 
On 19 November 1995, after six days of government standstill and tense 
negotiations, Congress and the President compromised on the language included in the 
second CR. The second CR enabled the government to temporarily reopen those agencies 
shut down by the funding gap. It also gave Congress and the President more time to 
negotiate on the larger budget issues. 
. 
3. The Second FY96 Continuing Resolution 
The second FY96 CR (PL 104-54) provided Congress and the President the one 
day they needed to complete the third FY96 CR. The second CR allowed the government 
to reopen on 20 November 1995 while final preparations went ahead on the signature of a 
third CR. Most spending provisions in the second CR mirrored those from the first. [Ref 
65, p. 540] 
The only notable difference in the second FY96 CR was the reduced funding 
provisions on certain programs. Under this new provision, programs not included in the 
congressional appropriations bills, but requested by the President, received 75 percent of 
their FY95 funding. The second CR expired on 20 November 1995 but gave Congress 
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and the White House enough time to enact a third CR. [Ref 65, p. 543] 
4. The Third FY96 Continuing Resolution 
The third FY96 CR (PL 104-56) extended the government's spending authority 
until 15 December 1995. Because the President signed the FY96 defense appropriations 
bill into law on 1 December 1995, this was the last CR to affect defense spending in FY96. 
The third CR resembled the second CR with two notable exemptions. [Ref 66, p. 553] 
The third CR mandated the enactment of a CBO-scored, seven year balanced 
budget while protecting "future generations" by ensuring "the solvency ofMedicare, 
welfare reform," and providing "adequate funding for Medicaid, education, agriculture, 
national defense, veterans, and the environment." [Ref 66, p. 553] Both Republicans in 
Congress and the President claimed victory with the compromise. The Republicans 
pointed to the seven year balanced budget, while the President claimed he had ensured the 
protection of several important programs. [Ref 67, p. 3597] 
The third CR also provided back pay to those federal workers furloughed during 
the six. day funding gap. On a larger scale, the third CR gave Congress and the President 
additional time to resolve their differences on the remaining appropriations bills. For 
defense, it allowed Congress to again tum its attention to the FY96 defense appropriations 
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Figure 6. Funding Legislation for Defense, FY96. From Refs. 63, 65, 66, and 77. 
B. CONCLUSION OF THE FY96 DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL 
After clearing Congress on 16 November 1995, the FY96 defense appropriations 
bill's future looked dim. Democrats within Congress predicted a quick presidential veto 
on the measure and the Republicans did not have the requisjte number of votes to override 
the veto. President Clinton indicated earlier in the year that he opposed the bill, and his 
advisors maintained their recommendation for his veto on the legislation. The President 
cited the addition of several unrequested weapons programs, conditions on his use of U.S. 
troops as peacekeepers, and restrictions on abortions performed at U. S. hospitals 
overseas as the basis for his opposition. [Ref 68, p. 3672] 
Other factors, however, forced the President to accept the FY96 defense 
appropriations bill. President Clinton's commitment to send 20,000 U. S. troops to 
Bosnia in support ofthe Balkan peace agreement signed on 21 November 1995 helped 
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him overcome his reluctance to sign the defense measure. The political realities of a 
Republican controlled Congress meant that funding for the Bosnian contingency operation 
would not be forthcoming unless the President signed the bill. 
Several Republicans in Congress expressed their fiustration at the White House 
because of its veto threat. Congressman Robert Livingston commented that "[While] 
preparing to send 20,000 troops to Bosnia, to seriously consider vetoing the defense 
budget, it boggles my mind." [Ref. 68, p. 3672] After several days of negotiations, the 
senior members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and White House 
Chief of Staff, Leon Pannetta, came to a tacit understanding that the FY96 defense 
appropriations bill would become law if Congress did not try to deny the use of defense 
funds for the Bosnian operation. [Ref. 68, p. 3672] 
While the President did not actually sign the FY96 defense appropriations bill, he 
did not veto the measure, and it became law without his signature on 1 December 1995. 
The President suggested, however, that he would seek to rescind money from various 
programs within the defense bill in February or March to fund U. S. operations in Bosnia. 
Table 14 details the final agreement on FY96 defense appropriations. [Ref. 68 p. 3672] 
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Table 14. Comparison of the President's FY96 Defense Request to the Final FY96 
Defense Appropriations Bill ~ Millions of Dollars). From Ref 69. 
Pres. Pres. Final Final Approp. Approp. 
Request Request Approp. Approp. vs. vs. 
BA 0 BA 0 Request Request 
BA 0 
Mil. Personnel $68,697 $66,283 $69,191 $66,752 +$494 +$468 
O&M $91,932 $92,103 $92,503 $92,755 +$571 +$652 
Procurement $34,409 $34,476 $43,918 $48,694 +$4,509 +$64 
RDT&E $34,332 $34,476 $35,625 $35,126 +$1,293 +$650 
Other $2,003 $1,671 $2,015 $1,719 +$11 +$49 
Total $236,372 $243,163 $243,251 $245,045 +$6,879 +$1,883 
C. CONCLUSION OF THE FY96 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL 
DEBATE 
While Congress and the President were able to reach an agreement on the FY96 
defense appropriations bill relatively quickly following the government shutdown, the two 
sides still had a difficult road ahead in their search for compromise on the FY96 defense 
authorization bill. Over two additional months of negotiations would be needed before the 
President signed the measure. This section resumes the examination of the evolution of 
the FY96 defense authorization bill which it left in chapter 5. 
1. Conference Debate 
House and Senate negotiators finally hammered out an agreement on the FY96 
defense authorization bill during the second week ofDecember 1995. Most notably, the 
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conference report retained the controversial provision for the accelerated deployment of a 
nationwide anti-missile defense system. The compromise also provided the authorization 
needed to begin procurement of several weapons systems already funded by the FY96 
defense appropriations bill. [Ref 70, p. 3819] 
At the urging of Senate Majority Leader and 1996 presidential hopeful, Senator 
Bob Dole, GOP-led conferees insisted upon the inclusion ofthe anti-missile defense 
system language. [Ref 70, p. 3819] The early deployment of an anti-missile defense 
system and the elimination of the ABM Treaty were top priorities for GOP defense hawks 
in Congress. The Administration, however, opposed the provision on the grounds that it 
jeopardized the Russian parliament's ratification ofthe START II Treaty because of the 
provision's possible violation of the ABM Treaty. Republican conferees maintained that 
while the provision called for the system's deployment by 2003, it did not violate the 
Treaty because it did not specify the system's deployment at more than one site. [Ref 71, 
p. 3898] 
The conferees added $7.1 billion to the President's FY96 request. Most of the 
additional funds, $5.2 billion, went for procurement. Combined with the additional $1.4 
billion provided for RDT &E, weapons programs received over 90 percent of the 
additional committee funds. [Ref 71, p. 3897] 
Overall, the defense spending authorized by the conference report closely 
resembled the funding levels provided by the FY96 defense appropriations bill passed 
earlier in the month. House and Senate negotiators worked out an interesting compromise 
on the controversial B-2. While the conference report retained the $493 million funding 
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level used in the FY96 defense appropriations bill, it remained deliberately ambiguous on 
exactly how the Pentagon was required to spend the money. It did not require the 
Pentagon to buy additional planes, but allowed the DoD to use the funds for "procurement 
ofB-2 components, upgrades and modifications that would be of value for the existing 
fleet ofB-2 bombers." [Ref 70, p. 3819] 
Like its counterpart defense appropriations legislation, the defense authorization 
bill partially funded the third Seawolf-class submarine and the components to be used in 
the first of a new class of smaller, cheaper attack submarines. It authorized two types of 
Marine assault ships and additional F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 aircraft. On non-defense 
programs, the bill tracked closely with the defense appropriations bill and approved $300 
million for the Nunn-Lugar program and $195 million for the TRP. It made small cuts in 
both environmental clean-up programs and peacekeeping operation funding. [Ref 71, pp. 
3898-3900] 
The defense authorization bill contained the annual cost ofliving pay increase for 
the military. The Republicans used this provision to criticize the President because his 
veto would deprive service members oftheir full2.4 percent pay raise. The defense 
authorization bill also contained a 5.2 percent increase in the military housing allowance 
and a provision to adjust the military's lagging annual cost of living adjustment back in line 
with their civilian counterparts. [Ref 71, p. 3897] 
House and Senate negotiators retained the controversial provision to bar female 
military personnel or dependents from obtaining abortions at U. S. military hospitals 
overseas. It also included the provision to discharge service members who tested positive 
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for the AIDS virus within six months. These two provisions, in conjunction with the anti-
missile defense language, received the harshest criticism from the Clinton Administration. 
[Ref 71, p. 3897] 
The House adopted the conference report, 267-149, on 15 December 1995. Four 
days later, the Senate followed suit on a closer 51-43 vote. The measure then went before 
the President for his approval. However, because the FY96 defense appropriations bill 
had already been signed into law, Congress now held much less leverage over the 
President. [Ref 71, p. 3897] 
2. Presidential Veto 
As expected, the President upheld his threat and vetoed the FY96 defense 
authorization bill on 28 December 1995. In a letter to the House, President Clinton 
detailed the motivation behind his veto. The President cited both social and political 
grounds for his rejection of the bill. [Ref 72, p. 26] 
In the letter, the President maintained that the bill "unacceptably restricts my ability 
to carry out national security objectives" and hinders "my implementation of~ey national 
security defense programs." [Ref 73, p. 1] He charged that the anti-missile defense system 
was costly, needlessly provocative towards Russia, and unjustified in the light of the 
current threat. Additionally, he criticized the restrictions placed on funding for 
contingency operations and the requirement for additional presidential guarantees when 
U.S. forces are placed under operational control ofthe United Nations. [Ref 73, p. 1] 
In the letter, the President reaffirmed his opposition to both the abortion and AIDS 
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discharge provisions in the bill. The President also mentioned the certification requirement 
placed on Nunn-Lugar funds and the slowdown in DoD environmental clean-up efforts as 
contributing to his decision to veto the bill. Responding to GOP rhetoric, President 
Clinton pledged his full support for the 2.4 percent pay raise. The President wrote that 
although he was vetoing the legislation, he would order a 2 percent pay raise, the 
maximum allowed by Congress. As soon as Congress sent him an acceptable defense 
authorization bill, he promised to approve the remaining 0.4 percent. Officially vetoed, 
the President sent the bill back to Congress. [Ref. 73, p. 1] 
3. Congressional Veto Override Attempt 
On 3 January 1996, the House attempted to override the President's veto. While a 
majority of the House did vote for the measure, it fell short of the required two-thirds 
majority, 240-156. Even ifthe House had mustered enough votes to override the 
President, it remained doubtful that the Senate would be able to do the same. [Ref. 74, p. 
61] 
In response to the President's veto, the Senate passed separate legislation 
authorizing the full2.4 percent military pay raise on a voice vote. The House, however, 
killed its version of the bill. GOP leaders in the House felt that separating this broadly 
supported provision would jeopardize the eventual passage of the defense authorization 
bill. After its failed override attempt, the House sent the bill back to conference. House 
and Senate negotiators tried to assess how many controversial programs they needed to 
strip out ofthe bill before they could gain presidential approval. [Ref 74, p. 61] 
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4. Defense Authorization Conference Part II 
House and Senate negotiators passed a revised version of the FY96 defense 
authorization bill on 19 January 1996. The bill, now dubbed S 1124, eliminated several 
controversial provisions contained within the original bill and modified others. 
Interestingly, the only changes made to the measure were policy related, as Congress held 
firm on its weapons programs funding. [Ref 75, p. 154] 
The conference report completely eliminated the anti-missile defense system 
provision. GOP members, however, vowed to make the anti-missile defense system an 
issue in the upcoming presidential election. The negotiators also eliminated the 
requirement for the President to submit various r~ports to Congress when he placed U. S. 
forces under U.N. command. Supporters of this requirement maintained that the removal 
of this provision symbolized a general willingness to subordinate U. S. interests to those of 
the U.N. [Ref 7, p. 154] 
The new bill modified the provision that the President submit a supplemental 
appropriations request to Congress for any contingency operation over $100 million from 
a requirement to a non-binding Sense of Congress. President Clinton complained that this 
hindered his ability to act as the Commander-in-Chief Both the provision discharging 
AIDS-infected service members and the bar on women obtaining abortions overseas 
remained unchanged in the bill. Although not completely satisfied with the bill, Secretary 
ofDefense, William Perry, "thought he could recommend to the President that he sign the 
bill." [Ref 75, p. 154] 
The House passed the revised defense authorization bill on 24 January 1995 on a 
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287-129 vote. The Senate did likewise two days later, 56-34. At this juncture, 
expectations for the President's signature were high. [Ref 76, p. 225] 
5. Presidential Signature 
The President ended the FY96 defense authorization bill debate on 10 February 
1996 when he signed the legislation into law. His signature ended the defense 
authorization process begun almost a year earlier. The President, however, was still not 
satisfied with the outcome and attempted to revise elements within the bill. He launched a 
multi-front effort to eliminate the requirement to discharge AIDS-infected service 
members. Calling the provision "abhorrent and offensive," the President ordered the 
Justice Department not to defend the provision if it was challenged in court. Additionally, 
he endorsed legislation to repeal the provision. Still, his signature provided closure to the 
debate on funding for defense for FY96. [Ref 77, p. 362] 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The final chapter of this thesis concludes the examination of defense spending for 
FY96. It attempts to explain the significance of the FY96 defense debate. The chapter is 
divided into four parts. The first section briefly revisits the key issues which arose during 
the formulation ofthe defense budget. It comments on the unique events which 
distinguished the defense debate for FY96. The second section of the chapter summarizes 
the results of the FY96 defense budget debate. It examines the impact of the so-called 
Republican Revolution on defense for FY96. 
The third section of the chapter takes a step back and analyzes the larger, long 
term defense readiness issues. Using the Readiness Triad model introduced at the 
beginning of the thesis, it explores alternative options to address the issue of sustainable 
military readiness. The final section of the thesis suggests areas for further research. It 
provides avenues for additional study on military readiness and spending issues. 
A. FY96 DEFENSE HIGHLIGHTS 
The November 1994 election ofthe first Republican controlled Congress in 40 
years dramatically altered the legislative status quo. The Republican goal of a balanced 
federal budget in seven years and a middle-class tax cut, in conjunction with a desire to 
end the decade long decline in defense spending, combined to produce a tumultuous 
environment for defense in FY96. Before the newly-elected Republican Congress had the 
opportunity to act on defense, President Clinton anticipated the Republican defense plus-
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up and proposed his own $25 billion increase to the FYDP. Republican defense hawks, 
however, considered this addition woefully inadequate. 
The House Republican's Contract with America promised to halt the decline in the 
size ofthe annual defense budget. Because it was never seriously pursued in the Senate, 
the Contract served only as a symbol for the Republican agenda. The Contract's defense 
provision did, however, contrast sharply with the President's defense budget request 
introduced during the same period, a budget which continued the annual decline in the size 
of the defense budget. 
Ideological differences threatened to divide the Republicans during the formulation 
of the FY96 Budget Resolution. Defense hawks squared off with deficit hawks over 
Republican priorities. The Senate's proposal to spend $10 billion less than the President 
during the next six years in the name of deficit reduction contrasted sharply with the 
House's plan which sought an additional $70.4 billion for defense during the same period. 
In the end, the two sides enacted a compromise which split the difference between the 
two, budgeting $24.8 billion above the President's request over six years, including an 
additional $7.1 billion for FY96. [Ref 38, p. 63] 
The FY96 defense authorization bill provoked heated debate in Congress and the 
White House. Social and policy issues contained in the measure proved especially 
divisive. The FY96 defense authorization debate also distinguished itself for its duration 
(8+ months). Because its passage lagged behind the FY96 defense appropriations bill by 
several months, questions concerning the relevancy of the defense authorization process 
arose. In the end, the final version of the bill scrapped the requirement for TMD and 
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restrictions on the President's use of troops in Bosnia, compromised on abortion language, 
and maintained the mv -discharge provision. 
As expected, the majority of the debate on the FY96 defense appropriations bill 
focused on the type and cost of several defense programs. New RDT &E projects and 
additional procurement programs added by the Republican Congress provoked charges 
from defense critics that the Republicans were still fighting the Cold War. The B-2 
bomber and Seawolf-class submarine, as well as a litany of other procurement programs, 
competed in the House and Senate for the additional defense dollars. In the end, 
compromises which allowed at least the partial purchase of most of these controversial 
systems passed Congress. 
Again, social policy issues inserted into the FY96 defense appropriations bill 
dominated much of the debate and threatened to derail the legislative process. Although 
the overseas abortion issue affected only a small number of female service members and 
dependents, it contributed to the bill's failure in the House and added several months to 
the bill's legislative process. While the spending programs contained in the measure 
consumed a majority of the floor time in their debate, it was the social issues which 
seemed to determine the bill's failure or success. 
Debate on the DoD's funding of contingency operations also consumed a large 
amount of time on the defense committee floors. A DoD request for supplemental 
appropriations to finance unbudgeted contingency operations generated a great deal of 
criticism in Congress. In the end, Congress mandated for the first time that the DoD 
budget for some known contingency operations (beginning in FY97). 
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Eventually, the Republicans pressured the President to allow the measure to 
become law by tying the purse strings for the planned peacekeeping operation in Bosnia to 
the passage of the FY96 defense appropriations bill. The President's desire to uphold his 
recent promise to support the peace initiative in Bosnia overshadowed his objections to 
the measure. The bill became law without his signature. Outside factors, therefore, 
strongly influenced the FY96 defense appropriations debate. 
The length and divisiveness of the FY96 defense debate, combined with the 
ambitious, but inexperienced Republican Congress and defense committees, delayed the 
completion of defense bills well into the new fiscal year. Because of this, defense 
experienced funding under three separate continuing resolutions and a lack of funding 
during a six day funding gap. Although neither continuing resolutions nor funding gaps 
were a new phenomenon, the number of continuing resolutions and duration of the 
funding gap distinguished the FY96 legislative process. Although the length, scope, and 
intensity of the defense debate all characterized the FY96 process as unique, the most 
telling aspect ofthe·defense debate was the final spending figures approved for FY96. 
B. SUMMARY OF FY96 DEFENSE SPENDING-- PUTTING IT IN 
PERSPECTIVE 
The FY96 defense appropriations bill authorized $243.2 billion in BA and $245.0 
billion in outlays (function 051). These amounts were $6.9 billion and $1.9 billion 
respectively, above the President's request. Still, these figures represent a 1.4 percent and 
4.9 percent real decline in defense spending respectively compared to the previous fiscal 
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year. [Ref 19, p. 11] 
Most of the additional dollars provided by Congress went to fund procurement 
($4.5 billion) and RDT&E ($1.3 billion). While the Republican defense budget provided a 
considerable plus-up to these accounts, the money did not actually reverse the general 
downward trend. At best, the additional monies stabilized the account funding close to 
the previous years' level. Figure 6 compares FY96 defense spending to the recent defense 
spending trends. Figure 7 illustrates the differences in proposed defense spending between 
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While the Republicans did address some of the O&M deficiencies identified in the 
previous years' defense budget, their most significant contribution to the long term 
readiness of the armed forces was their additions to the investment accounts. The 
Republicans attempted to readjust the balance between the short term operational 
readiness and longer term structural readiness with their procurement and RDT &E 
account plus-up. On other defense spending issues the Republicans were less successful. 
While the Republican Congress did trim some of the non-defense program funds from the 
defense budget, they did not reap the significant savings which they had hoped for in this 
area. 
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Although there is no question that the Republicans provided defense a significant 
plus-up in FY96, the long term implications of the Republican Revolution for defense are 
unclear. The monies added to the defense budget by the Republic_ans seem more like a 
temporary solution to the military readiness dilemma than a true reassessment and 
redirection of American defense priorities. Providing sustainable and affordable military 
readiness in the long term requires a reassessment of America's defense needs and 
resources. 
C. MILITARY READINESS OPTIONS 
The objective of the military in times of conflict is to fight and win the Nation's 
wars. In peacetime, it is to prepare itself to accomplish that mission. The concept of 
military readiness inherent in that preparedness dominates the debate on defense spending. 
Currently, many military experts in Congress, the DoD, and civilian community 
contend that the military must adopt a new approach in order to afford a capable, 
sustainable, and ready force. Many believe that the DoD cannot provide its current force 
structure both proper training and modem equipment in the long term. [Ref. 78, p. 1] 
They contend that the current defense budget of approximately $245 billion (function 051) 
does not provide for adequate modernization and recapitalization of the force. In an 
October 1995 letter to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Shalikashvili, and the other service secretaries stated that armed forces needed a 
minimum of $65 billion per year for procurement. FY96 procurement fell short of that 
goal by $20 billion dollars and is not likely to achieve that level of spending at any time 
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under the current FYDP. [Ref 79, p. 1] 
If there were no constraints on the amount of financial resources available, the 
solution would be simple; increase the annual DoD budget to $265-$270 billion. 
However, the current fiscally restricted environment makes this proposition highly 
unlikely. The plan to balance the federal budget, in conjunction with the continued growth 
of mandatory spending, combine to place tight constraints on the size of future defense 
budgets. 
Using the assumption that military budgets will remain at or below current funding 
levels, and that this amount is too small to adequately maintain both operational and 
structural readiness in the long term, changes to the current DoD assumptions must be 
made. The following section examines options for obtaining sustainable readiness in light 
of current financial constraints. It uses the Readiness Triad introduced in the beginning of 
the thesis as the readiness model to address possible alternatives. 
1. The Modernization Leg 
The modernization leg of the Readiness Triad is the element currently being 
sacrificed to support short term, operational readiness. By underfunding the procurement 
and RDT &E accounts, funds can be diverted to pay for the O&M and MilPers accounts. 
In other words, by failing to adequately fund the modernization leg of the Readiness Triad, 
the force structure and operational ability legs ofthe Triad have been maintained. 
However, the strategy ofunderfunding the modernization leg of the Triad to 
achieve short term readiness cannot continue indefinitely. The military equipment which 
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the modernization funds purchase will eventually wear out or become technically obsolete. 
To properly support the armed forces' divisions, wings, and ships in the long term requires 
reform in the military's funding priorities. 
2. The Force Structure Leg 
Reducing the size of the military's force structure provides one possible solution to 
the military readiness dilemma. By FY96, the drawdown enacted in response to the 
Bottom-Up Review's recommendations reduced the size of the military from over two 
million to its present size of approximately 1.5 million men and women. Obviously, 
further reduction in this area is possible. However, significant further force structure 
reduction requires a reassessment of the missions that the force structure is designed to 
support. 
The military requirements contained in the National Security Strategy and National 
Military Strategy provide the foundation for the size and composition of the current force 
structure. The ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts 
requires the bulk of the force structure. Further reduction in the force structure requires a 
revision of this mission. Several military and civilian think tanks have proposed that the 
military adopt a less demanding version oftheir current two JMRC mission, namely the one 
JMRC scenario plus a deterrence mission. This last proposal is the so-called "win, hold, 
win" alternative. Other ideas include a one JMRC mission plus deterrence with the added 
capability to provide large amounts of humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. [Ref. 80, 
p. 20] 
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Reduction in the size of the force structure begets savings in other legs of the 
Readiness Triad. Reduced force structure requires less operational ability support (e.g. 
training ammo, aviation fuel, etc.) and has fewer modernization requirements. However, 
given the size of the recent defense drawdown, this option could prove politically 
untenable. Again, a reassessment of America's security needs, which retreats from a two 
MRC requirement, allows for reductions in force structure which, in tum, increases the 
long term affordability of military readiness. 
3. The Operational Ability Leg 
Maintaining the day-to-day operational readiness ofthe military is the Clinton 
Administration's number one defense priority. [Ref 24, p. 20] During the period 1990-
1995, operational readiness was maintained at a high level, with 80 percent of military 
units meeting their readiness goals. [Ref 81, p. 1] However, recent personnel shortages 
and contingency operations have created "pockets ofunreadiness" in the armed forces. 
[Ref 82, p. i] Some fear these "pockets" could grow and lead to "hollowness" 
reappearing in the American military. 
The "hollow" American military forces of the 1970's were operationally 
underfunded. This lack of funding manifested itself in the form of reduced training, poor 
equipment maintenance, and overall lack of preparedness for war. Maintaining the current 
armed forces's operational readiness at a uniformly high level, however, is extremely 
expensive. 
In an effort to create a sustainable long term readiness plan, military and civilian 
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experts are examining the operational ability leg of the Readiness Triad. Although most 
agree that high levels of operational readiness are required for short term readiness, some 
believe that it is not necessary to maintain all the forces at .the same level of readiness. 
One idea currently being pursued is the concept of tiered readiness. 
Under tiered readiness, elements of the military with a strong likelihood ofbeing 
needed on short term notice (e.g., the Marines, the Army's 18th Airborne Corps, etc.) 
would be fully funded operationally (i.e., their O&M accounts). Units not likely to be 
need in the first few weeks of a crisis (e.g., some of the Army's heavy divisions) would be 
maintained at a reduced level of operational readiness. Varying the levels of desired 
readiness for military units on a small scale is not new. However, purposefully allowing 
large segments of the force to maintain a relatively lax readiness posture is a new idea that 
may produce significant savings. Although this proposition is being pursued by some 
members of the Senate, lingering memories of the "hollow" military years of two decades 
ago makes this option very unpopular with others in Congress and the DoD. [Ref 83, p. 
19] 
4. Other Options 
Because a re-examination of the balance among the three legs of the Readiness 
Triad is likely to produce controversial results, some members of Congress and the 
military are hoping to·achieve significant savings for defense in other areas. Privatization 
of some ofthe DoD's maintenance functions promises to achieve significant long term 
savings. Although allowing civilian contractors to perform services formerly done by the 
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military could yield significant savings, the anticipated amount of these savings may not be 
enough to avoid this. 
Two other proposals currently being advanced to help address the fiscal dilemma 
of the DoD are acquisition reform and technology efficiency. By reforming the 
cumbersome methods by which the DoD buys its equipment and developing ways of 
harnessing the massive growth in technology to benefit the DoD, some feel that the 
showdown on defense spending can be avoided. However, past efforts to achieve 
significant savings in these areas have proved quixotic. Nonetheless, a combination of the 
above solutions could prove substantial enough to solve the defense funding dilemma. It 
remains to be seen whether Congress tackles the issue directly by addressing the problem 
of sustaining funding for the Readiness Triad or whether its maintains its current course 
of postponing the debate by attacking the periphery of the problem. Richard Betts aptly 
summarizes the current defense dilemma. [Ref. 13, p. 23] 
Efficient coordination of proper changes in readiness with recognition of 
the specific times at which they are needed is terribly difficult. Peacetime 
choices, whichever way they tilt, pose risks. Lives and dollars ride on the 
decisions, but in different directions. Getting the answer wrong exacts a 
price in one currency or the other: either in blood in wartime or in treasure 
in peacetime. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Several options exist for further study in the areas discussed in this thesis. An 
examination of the formulation ofthe defense budgets in FY97 and beyond provides an 
obvious follow-up study. Analysis of the trends in defense spending during the current 
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environment of federal spending reform would build on some of the material provided in 
this thesis. Other possible avenues for further study include the continuing evolution of 
funding for military contingency operations and the ongoing debate over non-defense 
programs in the defense budget. 
Possibly the most significant avenue for further research, however, deals with the 
issue of military readiness. Underfunding the military's procurement accounts only 
postpones the debate on sustainable military readiness. Eventually, a reassessment of 
America's defense needs and the amount of resources it is willing to devote to that need 
must take place. A thesis which examined the solution to that debate would be an 
excellent legacy to this thesis. 
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